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APPENDIX 
ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the perplexing and controversial issues surrounding the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from patients in the persistent 
vegetative state. It analyses the recent, landmark decision in Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland, where the House of Lords held that doctors could lawfully 
withdraw artificial feeding from a permanently insensate patient with no hope of 
recovery. It probes the dubious foundation of the decision, the criterion adopted 
to guide the decision to withdraw nutrition and hydration, and the extension of 
the doctrine of necessity. 
The author suggests an alternative approach for New Zealand based on the New 
Zealand High Court decision in Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General 
should the courts be asked to consider whether doctors withdrawing artificial 
feeding regimes from persistent vegetative state patients will be criminally liable 
for culpable homicide. 
Finally, it considers decision-making criterion on which withdrawal decisions 
can be made and the role for advance directives in these decisions. The author 
supports the adoption of a good medical practice standard to guide decisions 
and ultimately legislative initiative in this area. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 14,776 words. 
- 2 -
INTRODUCTION 
Life and death used to be matters of fate, beyond human control. Now, life 
may be prolonged by the wonders of modem medicine, making death more a 
matter of human choice; a development which has provoked legal and ethical 
quandaries. These quandaries are not merely theoretical ; they are an unwelcome 
reality for many health professionals and families. 
Where competent adult patients refuse life-prolonging medical treatment, they 
bring the fundamental principles of sanctity of life and self-determination into 
conflict. More difficult problems arise where adult patients are no longer 
competent to make treatment decisions. If these patients did not indicate their 
treatment preferences whilst competent, the burden falls on others to decide . 
Should the incompetent patient become hopelessly and irreversibly unconscious 
the difficulties are compounded. Medical purposes and goals can no longer be 
achieved, but patients may still be maintained at extreme financial and emotional 
cost because of uncertainties in the law of homicide , or the psychological 
difficulties of removing the patient's life-sustaining treatment and care . 
The law has not advanced with technology , leaving doctors and families to make 
difficult and painful decisions without clearly defined guidelines. Especially 
traumatic, are terminal decisions involving patients in the persistent vegetative 
state (PVS). Withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration may be the only 
effective way to ensure the death of physical tenacious PVS patients . However, 
doctors contemplating the withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration 
may fear criminal responsibility for culpable homicide, and consequently, they 
may refrain from the proposed conduct. 
The House of Lords 1 was given the opportunity to consider, for the first time , 
whether artificial nutrition and hydration and other medical treatment could 
lawfully be withdrawn from a permanently insensate patient with no hope of 
recovery . Unfortunately, the law in England is no more certain now than it was 
before the case, which provides little comfort for doctors. The New Zealand 
courts have yet to address the issue . 
This paper will address the complex and contentious issues of liability for 
culpable homicide which would arise if, for example, Bland came before the 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 11 993 ] 2 WLR 316. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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New Zealand courts. 2 As background to the paper and in order to understand 
the difficulties involved, the paper begins with an outline of brain death and the 
persistent vegetative state . It goes on to consider the fundamental legal and 
moral principles which are invoked by terminal decisions and the reasons for 
legal intervention in the medical domain. 
The paper will then analyse the approach of the House of Lords in Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland, and contrast it with the preferable approach of the New Zealand 
High Court in Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General. 
3 The decisions will 
be used to assist in the consideration of liability for culpable homicide, and, to 
this end, the interpretation of sections 151 (1) and 164. 
Finally, the paper explores the criteria available to guide decisions to withdraw 
artificial feeding, and it concludes with a consideration of the role of advance 
directives in these withdrawal decisions. 
PART I 
THE DEFINITION OF DEATH 
Historically, death was defined as the irreversible cessation of respiration and 
circulation. Once the person ceased breathing and her heart stopped beating for 
a short period , the brain would be deprived of oxygen which would produce 
irreversible brain damage, and eventually brain death. 
4 With the developments 
in modem medicine respiration and circulation could be artificially maintained. 
This forced the reconsideration and clarification of the criteria for death, which 
led to the formulation of an additional and widely accepted criteria for death 
known as "brain death" .5 
2 Although the issues will be examined and developed in connection with adult patients in 
the persistent vegetative state, the analysis will apply to permanently comatose or 
unconscious patients in general. 
3 Auckland Health Board v Auorney-General [ 1993) 1 ZLR 235. 
4 D W Brock "Death and Dying " in R M Veatch Medical Ethics (Jones & Bartlett 
Publishers Inc, Boston , 1989) 329, 331-2. 
5 Papers Produced By Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and Their Faculties in the 
United Kingdom (1976) BMJ 1187; "Report of The Medical Consultants on the 
Diagnosis of Death to the US President's Commission For The Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research" (1981) 246 JAMA 
2184 . 
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Brain death can refer to either whole brain death, which is the irreversible loss 
of brain stem functions and higher cerebral functions, or brain stem death. 6 
Brain stem death is increasingly regarded as adequate; it can be firmly diagnosed 
once the stipulated procedures have been meticulously performed. 7 Although 
death is a continuous process not an isolated instance, 8 the time of death from a 
medical-legal perspective is a "discrete point in time" .9 The law has accepted 
the demarcation between life and death at the point of brain death. 
Before death the individual has all the rights and privileges bestowed by law on 
living people. On the determination of death numerous medical and legal 
consequences are triggered. Not only do positive responsibilities of treatment 
cease, but certain liberties may also be taken. Organs and tissue may be 
harvested, research may be undertaken, and the body may be frozen, incinerated 
or buried. 10 Most importantly, death by natural causes obviates the criminal 
law of homicide. 
The brain death criterion for death indicates a shift in perception of the final 
edge of life. 11 If the general perception were again altered to include 
neocortical death, then criminal liability for withdrawing treatment from PVS 
patients would no longer be an issue since the patient, by law, would be dead. 
Before proceeding further with this argument, an explanation of the PVS will 
help to illustrate how modem medical technology has blurred the distinction 
between life and death. 
WHAT IS THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE ST A TE? 
Jennett and Plum coined the term persistent vegetative state in 1972 to describe 
a condition where the patient has sustained acute damage somewhere in the 
cerebral cortex resulting in loss of cortical functions. 12 Cortical destruction 
6 The Bioethics Research Centre Persistent Vegetative State And The Withdrawal of Food 
and Fluids - A Report for the Medical Council of New Zealand, University of Otago, 
February 1993, 5 . 
7 The Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6. 
8 PDG Skegg "The Edges of Life" (1988) 6 Otago Law Review 517, 518 . G Williams 
Textbook on Criminal Law (2ed, Stevens and Sons, London, 1983) 281. 
9 R E Cranford and H L Smith "Some Critical Distinctions Between Brain Death and The 
Persistent Vegetative State" (1979) 6 Ethics in Science and Medicine 199, 206 . 
10 DJ Cole "The Reversibility of Death" (1992) 18 Journal of Medical Ethics 26. 
11 Skegg, above n 8, 520. 
12 B Jennett and F Plum "Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A Syndrome In 
Search Of A Name" (1972) The Lancet 734. B Jennett "Vegetative Survival After Brain 
Insults" (1988) 43 Anaesthesia 921. The term PVS has been criticised because 
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occurs when the brain is deprived of blood (ischemia) or oxygen (hypoxia) for 
approximately four to six minutes. 13 The same deprivation does not necessarily 
destroy the brain stem, which is more resilient and may survive such insults 
relatively intact. 14 
The cerebral cortex is responsible for one of the two dimensions of the brain: 
consciousness or the higher cognitive level of human functioning. 15 It facilitates 
self-awareness, memory, learning and adaptive behaviour such as conscious 
control of movements. 16 The other dimension of the brain is controlled by the 
brain stem. The brain stem controls the body's basic internal functions 
including temperature, heart beat, pulmonary ventilation, digestive activity and 
primitive reflex activity (i.e. pupillary response to light). 17 (See Appendix A). 
It is the functioning brain stem which clinically differentiates PVS from brain 
death. Brain death requires cessation of all brain stem functions as judged 
behaviourally. PVS patients, however, demonstrate a number of brain stem 
functions including cycles of sleeping and waking, spontaneous eye opening, the 
utterance of unintelligible, instinctive grunts or screams, the ability to breathe 
unassisted, gag and cough reflexes and sporadic movements of facial muscles 
and limbs. 18 
The PVS is characterised by a chronic state of unconscious in which the patient 
is totally unaware of herself or the environment, and a total absence of 
purposeful movements "reflecting consciousness, volition or emotion at the 
cerebral cortical level." 19 There is a large body of medical opinion which 
"persistent" has been understood to mean "permanent" which "is a statement of final 
outcome rather than a comment on the present state". See K Andrews "Managing the 
Persistent Vegetative State" (1992) 305 BMJ 486; P Alldridge and D Morgan "Ending 
Life" (1992) NU 1536. 
13 RE Cranford "The Persistent Vegetative State : The Medical Reality (Getting The Facts 
Straight)" (l 988) Hastings Centre Report 27. 27-28. Cranford indicates that the cortex 
is the part of the brain most vulnerable to this type of deprivation because of its high 
metabolic rate . See also Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 4 . 
14 Cranford, above n 13, 27-28. 
15 American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs "Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or 
Withhold Life Support " (1990) 263 JAMA 426,427 . 
16 Above n 15, Cranford , above n 13, 27. 
17 Bioethics Research Centre. above n 6, 5; Cranford, above n 13, 27. 
18 Above n 15, 427; Cranford et al, above n 9, 204 . 
19 Cranford, above 13, 28. See also American Academy of Neurology "Position of the 
American Academy of eurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of 
the Persistent Vegetative State Patient " (1989) 39 Neurology 125 . See also definition of 
PVS adopted by the Bioethics Research Centre. above n 6,4. 
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considers it impossible for PVS patients to experience pain and suffering. 
20 The 
American Medical Association stated that PVS patients have neither the capacity 
to perceive such stimuli nor the neocortical functions to generate a self-
perceived response. 21 Therefore, it is assumed that PVS patients do not 
experience pain based on their lack of cerebral capacity and the absence of 
physical symptoms commonly exhibited by conscious people when they 
experience pain. 22 However, a small number of PVS patients do exhibit 
physiological symptoms associated with pain which are alleviated by small doses 
of morphine. 23 
Discontinuance of treatment from PVS patients is not an option unless the 
diagnosis, and prognosis of irreversibility can be established with a high degree 
of certainty. The fundamental practical difficulty doctors face is deciding 
whether the patient is in the PVS. Unlike brain death, there are no published 
criteria to guide doctors, nor are there specific scientific laboratory studies to 
confirm the clinical diagnosis of PVS. 24 Diagnosis and prognosis may only be 
determined after the patient has been in the condition for a significant time 
period. 25 The suggested time period after which a patient can be reliably 
diagnosed as PVS is twelve months, 26 and no decisions regarding treatment may 
be made before a year has elapsed. After twelve months, the condition can be 
regarded as permanent and hopeless. 27 
It is possible for a patient in the PVS to survive for many years. Jennett and 
Dyer produced the following figures: 28 
20 Above n 15; American Academy of Neurology, above n 19; Bioethics Research Centre, 
above n 6; R E Cranford and D R Smith "Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral 
(Constitutional) Standard for Human Personhood" (1989) 13 American Journal of Law 
and Medicine 233, 239-240; Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of 
Prolonging Life and Assisting Death "Withdrawal of Life-Support From Patients in a 
Persistent Vegetative State" (1991) 337 The Lancet 96, 97 . 
21 Above n 15 , 428. 
22 L J Schneiderman "Exile and PVS" ( 1990) Hastings Centre Report 5 . 
23 Biological and Medical Issues Committee of the New Zealand Law Society Report For 
the Medical Council of New Zealand on "Persistent Vegetative State and the 
Withdrawal of Food and Fluids " 1993 , 2. The Committee notes that some PVS patients 
may require pain killing treatment if food and fluids are withdrawn. 
24 Cranford, above n 13, 29. See also D Thalblum "Persistent Vegetative State And 
Immortality : If This is Technically Life, The Legal Definition of Death Should 
Change" (1991) 59 UMKC Law Review 439, 443 . 
25 Cranford et al, above n 9, 205 . 
26 Above n 23, l; Jennett et al, above n 12; AMA, above n 15,428 . 
27 Above n 15, 428 . 
28 B Jennett and C Dyer "Persistent Vegetative State and The Right to Die: The United 
States and Britain" (1991) 302 BMJ 1256. 
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Of patients in a vegetative state three months after injury, about half die by twelve 
months but more than half of those still alive at one year live for three years or more, 
some surviving 12, 15, 18 and 36 years. 
The precise incidence of PVS in New Zealand are unknown. 29 Rough estimates 
based on the number of PVS patients in previous years place the number of 
cases in New Zealand in any one year. at approximately 3-4 (" a handful"). 30 
It is appropriate now to return to the issue introduced earlier, the redefinition of 
death. 
REDEFINING DEATH AND THE ISSUE OF PERSONHOOD 
PVS and other permanently unconscious patients are in a separate category from 
the dead, the terminally ill and the neurologically impaired. This is supported 
by judicial decisions which have differentiated between patients lacking 
consciousness and those with minimal consciousness. 31 Nevertheless, judicial 
decision-making is constrained by the fact that, for legal purposes, only two 
categories of person are recognised: alive or dead. 
The simple but crucial fact is that, under the current medical and legal definition 
of death, PVS patients are alive, even though their condition might be described 
as a "living death". 32 Recently. arguments have been advanced for the 
inclusion of neocortical death in the criteria for death, 33 to clarify the 
appropriate care for PVS patients. The term neocortical death has been used to 
29 The Bioethics Research Centre recommended recording PVS on the death certificate as a 
condition relevant to the patient 's death, as a means of clarifying the uncertainty . 
Above n 6, 29. 
30 Dr R Worth The Persistent Vegetative State - The Situation in · New Zealand From a 
Doctor 's Point of View Submission to the Biological and Medical Issues Committee of 
the New Zealand Law Society, 12 June 1993 . Dr Worth emphasised that this is a 
"guestimate" only , based on ICU figures for Wellington . However, informal inquiries 
support this conclusion . Dr S Williams , ex-Superintendent , Silverstream Hospital, 
stated that in 12 years , Silverstream Hospital treated three patients in the PVS . The 
Director of Anaesthetics, Palmerston North Hospital, advised that he had no knowledge 
of any PVS patients in recent years . 
31 Bland, above n 1, 371 ; In Re Jobes 529 A 2d 434 ( 1987); In Re Peter 529 A 2d 419 
(1987); see also Cranford et al . above n 20 . 
32 Bland, above n I, 366 ; AHB, aboYe n 3 , 245-246. See also Joe v Joe [ 19851 3 NZFLR 
675 , 680 where the court indicated that patients in an irreversible non-cognitive 
condition are alive for legal purposes and New Zealand doctors do not in practice 
certify them as dead ; Skegg, above n 8, 521. 
33 Cranford and Smith , above n 20 . R S Shapiro "The Case of LW: An Argument For a 
Permanent Vegetative State Treatment Statute" ( 1990) 5 I Ohio State Law Journal 439 , 
448; Thalblum, above n 24: D R Smith "Legal Recognition of eocortical Death" 
(1 986) 71 Cornell Law Review 850. 
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describe patients with an irreversible loss of consciousness and cogrut1ve 
functions. Upon diagnosis of neocortical death, doctors would not be under an 
obligation to continue artificial feeding. Its withdrawal would not constitute 
homicide because the patient would already be dead, and the law of homicide 
only protects the living. 
The proponents of neocortical death as a criterion for death consider the essence 
of human life and "personhood" to be the capacity for consciousness (i.e. the 
ability to think, feel and interact with society). 34 The permanent and 
irreversible loss of these distinguishing features of human life is considered to be 
as significant as the loss of brain stem functions, since the person is no longer 
"alive" in any ethically interesting sense. 35 Therefore, irreversible cessation of 
cortical functions, as exemplified by the PVS patient, constitutes the death of the 
person. 36 
The difficulty of redefining death in terms of neocortical death lies in the 
clinical uncertainties of diagnosing the PVS. 37 The acceptance of brain stem 
death as a criterion for death was inextricably linked to the certainty of diagnosis 
based on the results of specific, widely accepted tests. To date, the medical 
profession have not been able to pinpoint the cause of PVS and identify tests 
which would provide the same degree of diagnostic certainty associated with 
brain death. 
Neocortical death as a criterion for death is difficult to accept for several other 
reasons. Neocortical death classifies PVS patients as non-persons, denying them 
the fundamental protection of the criminal Jaw, which offends against all notions 
of morality and equality. 38 From the health professional' s perspective, the 
34 Smith, above n 33, 859-860; Cranford and Smith, above n 20, 233-234; Shapiro, above 
n 33, 448. 
35 G R Gillet "Why Let People Die?" (1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 83, 84. See 
also J A Gold "The Status of The Permanently Unconscious 'You Call That Living?'" 
(1991) 42 Mercer Law Review 1087; Shapiro, above n 33, 448. 
36 Cranford and Smith, above n 20, 243; Shapiro, above n 33, 448. 
37 Shapiro, above n 33, 448; Cranford and Smith, above n 20, 243. 
38 Law Reform Commission of Canada Protection of Life, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and 
Cessation of Treatment Working Paper 28, 1982, 33-34. See also D Lanham Taming 
Death By Law (Longman Professional, Melbourne, 1993) 179. 
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extreme vulnerability of these patients does not classify them as non-per ons. 
rather it leads to an attachment to the patient and a greater resolve to care for 
them. 39 
Redefinition of death would involve a significant departure from traditional 
notions of death . .io N eocortical death paradoxically recognises that the body is 
alive, while the patient is not. 41 However, it is the physical characteristics of 
PVS patients which distinguish them from brain dead patients. Facial grimaces. 
spontaneous respiration and circulation, and other involuntary movements 
indicate that life is still present. It is, precisely, this reason why PVS patients 
are considered to be "alive". 
If death is determined on the basis of neocortical death. the remaining bodily 
functions cannot be terminated immediately by the withdrawal of life-support 
systems. Burial and cremation would be possible, whilst the patient still 
exhibited signs of life. If there is a reluctance to do this, can it really be said 
that the patient is dead?42 
Under the neocortical death criterion for death, not only would withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration be permissible, but a quicker. more direct means of 
ending the bodily functions, by lethal injection, would be possible (and legal). 
This would spare health professionals and family from the further distress of 
watching the patient's prolonged death. These are thorny issues which are 
beyond the scope of this paper. but it is doubtful whether society is ready for 
such radical advances . 
Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful whether neocortical death as a criterion 
for death is socially, legally or morally acceptable at the pre~ent time. 43 The 
redefinition of death as a means for withdrawing treatment from PVS patients is 
not supported in this paper. It is an extremely controversial step, which should 
be taken by Parliament, not the Courts, if it is to be taken at all. Although the 
39 P W Armstrong and 8 D Colen "From Quinlan to lobes: The Courts and the PYS 
Patient: ( I 988) Hastings Centre Report 37, 39. Dr R Worth, eurosurgeon. 
Wellington Hospital, also confirmed this point. 
40 Cranford and Smith, above n 20, 243-4. 
41 D Wikler "The Definition of Death and Persistent Vegetative State" in TA Mapes and 
JS Zembaty Biomedical Ethics (3 ed, McGraw-Hill Inc, New York, 1991) 396, 398 . 
42 B A Brody "Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient" (1988) 
Hastings Centre Report 33, 34. 
43 R D Mackay "Terminating Life Sustaining Treatment - Recent US Development" 
(1988) 14 Journal of ~lcdical Ethics 135, 138 . 
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emphasis is increasingly on the irreversible loss of brain functions than on 
heartbeats, 44 there are still legitimate reservations which must be overcome. 
PART II 
BLAND - THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 
Anthony Bland was a victim of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster. In 
the course of the disaster, his chest was severely crushed, which punctured his 
lungs and interrupted the oxygen supply to his brain. The injury caused 
irreparable damage to the cortex and destroyed all the higher functions of his 
brain. His condition was diagnosed as the persistent vegetative state. For 
maintenance of life, Mr Bland was artificially fed and hydrated through a 
nasogastric tube. The unanimous medical opinion of doctors who examined Mr 
Bland indicated that there was no hope for recovery or improvement of any 
kind. However, with vigorous medical care, he would have been able to 
survive for many years. 
The responsible doctors, supported by Mr Bland's parents, concluded that no 
useful purpose was served by continuing medical care. They considered it was 
appropriate to cease artificial feeding and other life-prolonging medical 
treatment. The decision was supported by independent medical opinion. The 
proposed removal of medical care would inevitably result in the patient's death. 
Doubts about the lawfulness of the proposed conduct were raised, which 
prompted the responsible health authority to apply to the Family Division of the 
High Court for declarations as to the lawfulness of the proposed conduct. 45 
The declarations were granted by the Family Division of the High Court (19 
November 1992), the Court of Appeal (9 December 1992) and the House of 
Lords (4 February 1993). 
44 Skegg, above n 8, 521-522; Thalblum, above n 24, 460; Australian Law Reform 
Commission Human Tissue Transplants Report No 7, 1977, 53-4. 
45 Bland, above n 1, 331; 334; 364-365. It is interesting to note that Sir Stephen Brown P 
in the High Court excluded the words "pain and suffering" from the second part of the 
declaration, unlike the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Their inclusion of 
"pain, suffering and distress" is bewildering. They are irrelevant to a PVS patient. 
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
The fundamental principles of sanctity of life and self-determination underlie the 
decisions in the Bland case. They will form the backdrop to any consideration 
of a proposal to withdraw life-sustaining nutrition and hydration. These 
principles will now be examined . 
Sanctity Of Life 
In our society human life has traditionally been recognised as a deeply ingrained 
value . The protection of this fundamental human value is a primary function of 
the criminal law, which forbids homicide and reprimands those who place others 
in serious danger. 46 Its importance receives expression through the principle of 
sanctity of life. Sanctity of life views all human life as intrinsically valuable, 
irrespective of its quality and kind , and absolutely inviolable. 47 This deeply 
rooted belief indicates why society considers it almost always wrong to 
intentionally kill another human being despite their disability or illness . 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 recognises the individual's right to 
life , which may only be overridden by legally established grounds. Section 8 
states : 
Right not to be deprived of life - No one shall be deprived of life except on such 
grounds as are established by law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice. 
Despite the respect afforded life, sanctity of life it is not an absolute value in 
itself. 48 It is more resemblant to a rebuttable presumption in favour of life. 
The decriminalisation of attempted suicide and the recognition of self-defence as 
a defence to culpable homicide illustrate this. 
The Courts have been accused of merely paying lip-service to sanctity of life, 
the Bland case being the latest erosion of the principle because it implies that not 
all human beings are equally entitled to such concern and respect. 49 However, 
firm adherence to the sanctity of life principle is untenable given the enormous 
46 AHB, above n 3, 244 ; Law Reform Commission of Canada, above n 38 , 3. 
47 H Kuhse The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine - A Critique (Clarendon Press , 
Oxford, 1987) 5. 
48 AHB, above n 3, 244 ; Bland, above n 1, 367; Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
above n 38 , 5 . Limits must be placed on the principle otherwise the sanctity of life 
principle will require incompatible actions . See Kuhse, above n 4 7, 27 . 
49 A Fisher "The Road to Euthanasia" (1993) The Tablet 235 . 
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advances in modem medicine. 50 Such advancements require a reconsideration 
of the sanctity of life principle in relation to medical decisions. The 
employment of all available medicines and machines to preserve human life 
regardless of the surrounding circumstances is impracticable, if not impossible 
given the limits in resources, and for many it would be unethical. 51 
Certainly, fundamental medical ethics require the preservation of life, but a 
doctor's role is not just that of life preserver. 52 Doctors must consider and 
abide by patients' wishes, which may require the removal of treatment, and in 
other cases doctors may consider life-sustaining treatment not to be in the 
patients' best interests. 
Respect and concern for human beings are not necessarily illustrated by 
continuing treatment. They are shown by adherence to the prohibition on 
intentional termination of patients' lives. Thus, a qualified duty of life 
preservation allows doctors, in certain circumstances, to let patients die. The 
courts have condoned this approach, holding that it is always wrong to actively 
kill a patient (i.e. active euthanasia), but in certain prescribed circumstances, a 
doctor may refrain from preventing a patient's death. 53 
Self-Determination 
Competent adult patients 
It is a fundamental common law principle that any medical treatment involving 
interference with a person's body without the person's consent constitutes an 
50 A M Gaudin "Cruzan v Director, Missouri Depanment of Health: To Die or Not to 
Die: That is the Question - But Who Decides" (1991) 51 Louisiana Law Review 1307, 
1310. 
51 LRC of Canada, above n 38, 6; In Re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209, 1250 (1985). 
52 D Cook Patients' Choice - A Consumer's Guide to Medical Practice (Hodder & 
Stroughton Publishers, London, 1993) 122. Kuhse, above n 47, 26-27, suggests that a 
pure sanctity of life doctrine cannot be applied in today's technological environment: 
If we were to act in accordance with this principle, medicine would be entering 
its zealous phase, where the preservation of life would take precedence over all 
other medical and social objectives. Every wisp of life would have to be 
preserved, irrespective of whether such measures would be benefiting or 
harming the individual patient. However, such a position is not only 
intuitively implausible, it is ultimately unintelligible . 
Jennett argued openly on the quality of life basis that life-sustaining treatment is 
"justified only if there is a reasonable probability of meaningful recovery and of 
regaining life as a social person." See B Jennett "Letting Vegetative Patients Die" 
(1992) 305 BMJ 1305 . 
53 Bland, above n 1, 368-369; Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 34. 
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assault, unless the touching is otherwise justified by law. 54 The requirement of 
consent is based on the principle of self-determination and individual autonomy 
which ensure respect for individuals and protect their right to live their lives as 
they choose. 55 
A person's right to self-determine and decline medical treatment is given 
statutory recognition in New Zealand. Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 provides that "everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any 
medical treatment". 
The competent patient's right to choose is almost absolute and the decision must 
be respected, regardless of its rationality or reasonableness. 56 This principle 
allows a properly informed patient to require the removal of life-support 
systems. 57 To this extent, the sanctity of life principle is at variance with, and 
must yield to, the individual's right to self-determination. 58 
Incompetent adult patients 
Situations commonly anse where the patient 1s m no condition to give or 
withhold consent to medical treatment. For example, due to a traffic or other 
accident, the person may be rendered unconscious. Consent is not essential in 
every situation to ensure that the doctor's conduct is lawful. If it was, 
54 Bland, above n 1, 367; 381; see also C Lewis "Medical Treatment In Absence of 
Consent" (1989) 86 Law Society Gazette 32; Thalblum, above n 24; 444; However, Dr 
Collins emphasised that criminal proceedings are unlikely to be brought against a doctor 
on these grounds, unless there is an extreme breach of trust necessitating the 
intervention of the criminal law. D B Collins Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker 
and Friend, Wellington, 1992) 67. 
55 Collins, above n 54, 66; D Tbalblum, above n 24; 445. Schloendorff v Society of New 
York Hospital 105 NE 92 (1914). 
56 Bland, above n 1, 342; 367. C Bridge "Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious 
Grounds" (1992) ZLJ 341 ; see also Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (I 992) 86 DLR 
(4th) 385 , 391 , where the court stated that the patient 's right was subject to the 
corresponding rights of others. 
57 Nancy B, above n 56, 392. The doctors must respect the patient's refusal of treatment, 
even though the doctors may (paternalistically) consider the refusal to be adverse to the 
patient 's best interest. See Schloendorff, above n 55, 93. The New Zealand Courts 
have yet to decide whether doctors acting on patients' instructions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment would be liable for culpable homicide. 
58 In Re T [ 1992) 3 WLR 782 . Lord Donaldson acknowledged the paramountcy of self-
determination over society's conflicting interest in sanctity of life. However, the Court 
placed an important limitation on the right to self-determination. If the patient is 
considered , by the doctors , not to have given "a properly informed refusal" then the 
refusal of life-saving medical treatment may be overridden. See generally C Lewis 
"Freedom of Choice" ( 1992) 46 Law Society Gazette 27, 28; Bridge, above n 56 . 
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incompetent patients would not receive necessary medical treatment. 
Difficulties do arise however, where life-sustaining procedures and treatment 
have been instituted and the patient is unable to request their removal should the 
patient's condition become hopelessly irreversible. 
Suggestions have been made that the law should strenuously avoid any form of 
discrimination against incompetent patients, and on the basis of equality, these 
patients should have the same right to self-determination and choice that 
competent patients have. 59 However, these suggestions overlook the fact that 
incompetent patients are in no position to self-determine or make a choice about 
treatment. 60 Nevertheless, to be consistent with the primacy given to the 
principle of self-determination, the law must provide a means of enabling 
treatment decisions to be made on behalf of incompetent patients, which include 
in appropriate circumstances, the withholding or withdrawal of treatment. 61 
Indeed to do otherwise would result in discrimination since 
the incompetent patient [would] always be subjected to what many rational and 
intelligent persons may decline [which would] downgrade the status of the incompetent 
person by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality . 62 
This introduces notions of what reasonable, competent people would desire were 
they in a persistent vegetative state, as factors guiding treatment to be 
administered to incompetents. These arguments and judicial observations 
proceed on the basis that concern and respect for incompetent patients are best 
demonstrated by treating them like competent patients. 63 Dresser objects that as 
a result, the patient's immediate position, which may differ considerably from 
that of competent patients, is completely overlooked. 64 
The law acknowledges that life-sustaining decisions must be made in relation to 
incompetents, and that consistency will be achieved if third parties are permitted 
to make treatment decisions on the patient's behalf. What must be recognised is 
that third parties are making the deci ions, which is different from patients 
exercising their right to self-determination. 65 Therefore, the question arises, 
59 LRC of Canada, above n 38 , 57. Bland, above n 1, 368; Superintendent of 
Belcher/own State School v Saikewicz 370 NE 2d 417 (1977). 
60 Lanham, above n 38, 114. 
61 Bland, above n 1,368. 
62 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz 370 NE 2d 41 7, 428 ( 1977). 
63 R Dresser "Life, Death, And Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden 
Values in the Law" (1986) 28 Arizona Law Review 373, 375 . 
64 Dresser, above n 63, 373. 
65 Lanham, above n 38, 114. 
----
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who should make the decisions for incompetent patients? The New Zealand 
High Court is one possible decision maker. Under its inherent parens patriae 
jurisdiction, the Court has the power to make treatment decisions on behalf of 
adult incompetent patients. 66 
PARENS PA TRIAE JURISDICTION 
The parens patriae jurisdiction refers to the High Court's penumbra! residual 
protective capacity, under which the Court has the power and duty to protect 
mentally incompetent adults or those of unsound mind (formerly described as 
lunatics or idiots). 67 
In Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General it was open to the Court to invoke 
its parens patriae jurisdiction to consent to the withdrawal of a ventilatory 
system from a patient suffering from extreme Guillain-Barre Syndrome. 68 
Thomas J considered that the High Court's inherent protective jurisdiction could 
be invoked to authorise the withholding or withdrawal of life-support treatment, 
since to preserve life at all costs may not be in the patient's best interests. 69 
Judicial Intervention In The Medical Domain 
Although the Court has the power to consent on behalf of incompetent adult 
patients, it would be preferably if it did not invoke its parens patriae 
66 The parens patriae jurisdiction is an ancient prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown, 
which still applies in New Zealand: see Pallin v Department of Social Welfare [ l 983] 
NZLR 266; Re X [1991] 2 NZLR 365; Auckland Health Board v Attorney General 
[1993] 1 NZLR 235. The basis for the parens patriae jurisdiction is section 17 of the 
Judicature Act 1908. See also E Grant "Consent to Medical Procedures and The 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988" (1989) 7 Otago Law Review l 6 l. 
67 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [ 1990] 2 AC l, 57. Grant above n 66, 174. 
68 Thomas J did not consider whether the Court's inherent jurisdiction should be invoked. 
Instead His Honour made declarations under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, that 
the doctors' removal of the ventilatory support was lawful. Above n 3,242. 
69 AHB, above n 3, 242. In Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 
33 followed. See also In Re Eve [1986] 31 DLR (4th) l. The applicability of the 
"patient's best interest" standard to PVS or permanently comatose patients will be 
disputed later. 
Thomas J suggested that patient's best interests is one of two standards available in the 
exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction, the other being substituted judgment. See In 
the Matter of Karen Quinlan 355 A 2d 647 (1976). These alternative approaches will 
be discussed in full later. 
- 16 -
jurisdiction. Otherwise, applications would have to be made to the Court every 
time doctors and family agreed that artificial feeding should be removed from 
the PVS patient. 
Decisions to remove artificial nutrition and hydration are essentially medical 
decisions. Applications to the court for judicial approval of such decisions 
involves the court in an area of expertise which is better left to members of the 
medical profession who are in "the ordinary business of providing clinical care" 
and frequently make life and death decisions. 70 Thomas J in the AHB case 
accepted that courts should not intrude into "the legitimate province of the 
doctors and their patients". 71 Furthermore, it was indicated that the New 
Zealand Courts would be hesitant to resolve issues which are essentially clinical , 
private decisions, and are more appropriately made by doctors, patients and 
their families. 
Apart from intruding on the medical profession's "field of competence", such 
applications are cumbersome and an extreme financial and emotional burden on 
the patient's family. 72 If applications for court approval were mandatory , 
caring, conscientious families and health professionals may be deterred from 
making appropriate treatment decisions for two equally distressing reasons . 
Doctors may face criminal prosecution for culpable homicide if they withdraw 
life-sustaining nutrition and hydration without first applying for a declaration to 
determine the conduct's lawfulness. In order to secure judicial approval, it has 
been noted that considerable time, effort and money must be spent, which 
neither doctors nor relatives may be willing or able to undertake. 73 
Furthermore , where applications are made, families who make the anguishing 
decision to allow their relatives to die peacefully, are exposed to media coverage 
and potential actions from extremist groups who would automatically oppose 
any withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. 74 
70 This was a doctor 's perspective, given by an eminent neurosurgeon, Dr Gillet, in the 
AHB case. See also submissions by Attorney-General and Counsel for the second 
plaintiff, above n 3, 241 . 
71 AHB, above n 3, 241. 
72 AHB, above n 3, 241. See also In the Matter of Karen Quinlan , above n 69 , 669 . N L 
Cantor Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying (Indiana University Press , Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 1987) 114 . 
73 Cantor, above n 72, 114. 
74 After the House of Lords decision in favour of removal of the life-support regimes from 
Anthony Bland, and the attendant publicity, pro-life groups continued their protests 
outside the hospital where Mr Bland was a patient. See "Tony Bland Dies " (1993) 
Bulletin of Medical Ethics 5. In addition, because Mr Bland ' s parents supported the 
application by the Airedale NHS Trust to withdraw their son 's artificial feeding regime, 
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Regularised judicial involvement in decisions to withhold or withdraw artificial 
feeding from PVS patients is neither practical nor desirable. It can be 
minimised or even avoided, if the court issues broad guidelines for doctors to 
follow in future cases as it did in the AHB case. Not only would guidelines 
avoid the need for unwieldy applications which would place unnecessary distress 
and burdens on families and doctors, they would also avoid judicial intrusion on 
11 the medical profession's field of competence 11 • 
Even though the High Court in the AHB case stepped in to the medical domain 
to make a declaratory order, the judgment was designed to assist doctors to 
reach treatment decisions in the future without recourse to the courts. 75 The 
civil declaration could not change the legal status of the proposed conduct nor 
prevent criminal proceedings in respect of the same subject matter. 76 However, 
in practical terms, authoritative guidance from a court would normally inhibit or 
seriously prejudice a criminal prosecution. 77 Therefore a civil ruling should 
offer considerable assurance to health professionals that their actions will not 
cause repercussions with the criminal law. It frees them "in the pursuit of their 
heading vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or self-protection 
concerns which would inhibit their independent medical judgments for the well-
being of their . . . patients. 1178 
Should The Court Play Any Role? 
Withholding regular judicial participation in decisions to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment will not exclude all judicial scrutiny of the delicate 
matter. 79 The court still has an important role to play. In a small number of 
cases parties involved in the decision whether to remove artificial nutrition and 
hydration may not agree and they should be free to approach the court for a 
ruling on the matter. 80 Occasionally, judicial review may ensue through 
Scottish Roman Catholic Priest and Pro-Life Campaigner, Father James Morrow, 
threatened them with a private prosecution. Naturally, this caused the parents 
considerable distress in addition to the grief they were already suffering from the loss of 
their son . The threat turned out to be an idle one . J McLeod "Moral Maze" (1993) 90 
Law Society Gazette 10. 
75 Above n 3, 241. 
76 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Attorney General [1981] AC 718 . 
77 Bland, above n I , 391; AHB, above n 3,244. 
78 In the Matter of Karen Quinlan , above n 69, 668 . 
79 Cantor, above n 72 , 116 . 
80 Issues Committee, above n 23, 4. The Committee considered the Family Court should 
be the independent decision-maker in the event of a dispute for the following reasons: 
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criminal prosecutions, should doctors or other health professionals neglect duties 
owed to patients or make decisions which are not bona fide. 
Funher Reasons For Legal Intervention 
Although decisions to remove artificial nutrition and hydration from PVS 
patients are primarily medical, there is still a need for legal intervention. As 
Professor Glanville Williams has noted, the diagnosis of death may be medical, 
but the definition of death is a legal issue . 81 
Doctors should also have recourse to the courts when uncertainties in the law 
require clarification. 82 They may be faced with uncertainties because of the 
ancient legislation, (i.e. the Crimes Act 1961), applicable to conduct which 
results in a person's death. While the principles encapsulated in the pertinent 
sections of the Crimes Act 1961 remain valid, the wording is outdated and 
inappropriate to cover the booming technological developments which have 
occurred in medical science. 83 
Therefore, the Courts will continue to play an important role in this area. A 
number of landmark decisions relating to the withdrawal of treatment from PVS 
patients have already been made, 84 but with advancing technology and social 
attitudes, new legal issues will continue to arise , mandating further judicial 
intervention. 85 
NECESSITY 
An alternative basis for decision-making which avoids application to the court is 
the common law doctrine of necessity . The House of Lords in Bland used this 
They already exercise jurisdiction under the Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights Act 1988 . 
They are in the best position to consider whether, for example, all family 
members have been consulted . 
81 G Williams Textbook on Criminal Law (2 ed Stevens & Sons, London, 1983) 281. 
82 Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 20; Dr G Gillet in AHB, above n 3, 241. See 
also Dr R Worth, above n 30. 
83 The pertinent sections of the Crimes Act 1961 which will be considered later in the 
paper are sections 151 and 164, were originally drafted over a century ago , in 1879. 
AHB, above n 3, 247. 
84 These are mainly United States decisions , for example Jn the Matter of Karen Quinlan , 
above n 69 ; Cruzan v Director of Missouri Department of Health I 10 S Ct 2841 
(1990); Barber v Superior Court of State of California 195 Cal Rptr 484 (1 983). 
Bland, above n l, is the only United Kingdom decision so far. 
85 Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 2 1. 
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doctrine as the basis for deciding that doctors could lawfully remove artificial 
nutrition and hydration from a PVS patient. Consequently, there is compelling 
authority for the use of the doctrine in New Zealand , even though the New 
Zealand High Court could exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to consent to 
the treatment ( or its withdrawal) on the patient's behalf. 
There are several advantages to using the doctrine of necessity (as outlined 
below) which make it a preferable decision-making tool. It has the advantage of 
permitting doctors to act immediately, and have their conduct excused 
retrospectively . 86 Doctors, institutions, or families would not have to apply to 
the Court to authorise their actions . Whereas invocation of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction involves an expensive , cumbersome application for a 
contemporaneous decision. Furthermore , section 20 of the Crimes Act 1961 
retains all common law principles and rules which render any circumstances a 
justification or excuse for any act or omission. 
Therefore, the Bland case , provides compelling authority for the suggestion that 
under the doctrine of necessity doctors ' withdrawal of treatment should be 
considered lawful. 
Development Of The Doctrine Of Necessity 
It is well established that consent is a prerequisite to lawful medical intervention 
in almost every case . However, as already noted , there are situations where the 
patient is unconscious or otherwise incompetent, and unable to consent. Unlike 
the New Zealand courts , the English courts cannot consent to treatment on the 
incompetent patient's behalf since its parens patriae jurisdiction over 
incompetent adults no longer exists . 87 It seemed that the law provided no 
means by which necessary medical treatment could lawfully be administered to 
incompetent adult patients. Faced with this lacuna in the law, the House of 
Lords88 developed a principle which would justify medical intervention in the 
86 I owe this idea to Dr David Collins . 
87 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 57 (per Lord Brandon of 
Oakbrook) and 71 (per Lord Goff of Chieveley) . See also Bland, above n 1, 369 (per 
Lord Goff of Chieveley), 377-378 (per Lord Lowry), 385 (per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson). The English Courts ' parens patriae jurisdiction over mentally incompetent 
adults ceased to exist as a result of the joint effect of section 1 of the Mental Health Act 
1959 and the revocation by Warrant under the Sign Manual of the last Warrant dated 10 
April 1956, by which the Crown 's jurisdiction over persons of unsound mind had been 
assigned to the High Court . 
88 In Re F, above n 87 . 
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absence of consent on the basis of the common law principle of necessity. Lord 
Brandon explained the common law solution in the following terms: 89 
[A] doctor can lawfully operate on, or give other treatment to, adult patients who are 
incapable , for one reason or another, of consenting to his doing so , provided that the 
operation or other treatment concerned is in the best interests of such patients. The 
operation or other treatment will be in their best interests if, but only if, it is carried out 
in order either to save their lives, or to ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in 
their physical or mental health. 
Where the patient is in need of treatment, but unable to consent, a doctor can 
lawfully treat the patient on the basis of necessity and in many cases the doctors 
will have a common law duty to do so. 
Lord Goff analysed the doctrine of necessity and concluded that, as a general 
rule , necessity will allow doctors to lawfully treat a patient in the absence of 
consent, provided the following criteria are met: 90 
(1) [There must] be a necessity to act when it is not practicable to communicate 
with the assisted person, [and] 
(2) the action taken must be such as a reasonable person would in all the 
circumstances take, acting in the best interests of the assisted person . 
Naturally , the defence of necessity would not avail a doctor if she treated the 
patient against the patient's clearly expressed wishes, which were communicated 
to the doctor before the patient became incompetent. 91 Furthermore, the doctor 
must, when deciding on the form of treatment for the incompetent patient, act in 
accordance with a responsible and competent body of relevant professional 
opinion, skilled in the particular form of treatment in question. 92 Treatment 
provided on this basis will be in the patient's best interests . 93 
The House of Lords in the Bland case considered how the doctrine of necessity 
could justify the removal of artificial feeding from a PVS patient. The starting 
point was a consideration of how the life-sustaining regime was initially 
instituted. 
89 Above n 87, 55 . 
90 In Re F. aboven87 , 75-76 . 
91 Maleue v Schulman (1987) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
92 The House of Lords in In Re F adopted the test laid down in Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [ 1957] 2 ALL ER 118 . 
93 The inapplicability of patient 's best interests as a standard for decision-making for PVS 
patients will be discussed later. 
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Necessity: Applied By The House Of Lords 
When Anthony Bland came into the doctors' care he was unconscious; it was an 
emergency situation. He was unable to consent to treatment so decisions were 
made for him on the basis of his best interests. At this point, Anthony's best 
interests required that he be treated aggressively which included the institution 
of life-support measures (i .e . artificial feeding) . 
The doctors arrive at a diagnosis of PVS and a prognosis of permanence only 
after the patient had received aggressive medical attention, undergone repeated 
diagnostic studies and been carefully observed for a prolonged period. 94 Prior 
to diagnosing the PVS, improvement was thought possible , even to the extent of 
a return to sapient life. 95 It is only at a later stage, when it became apparent 
that the patient would not regain consciousness , and there was no hope for 
recovery , that life-sustaining procedures and treatment needed to be re-
examined . 96 
In these circumstances , the question arises, whether the artificial feeding regime 
can be justifiably continued. Non-consensual medical regimes will be lawful 
and justifiable only if it is in the patient ' s best interests to receive such medical 
care . 
When Anthony Bland was diagnosed as permanently vegetative none of the 
following goals of medical treatment and care could be met: 97 
prevention if death; 
curing illness , injury and disease; 
maintenance of the status quo (i .e. preventing deterioration of the 
condition) ; 
relieving pain and suffering (i.e . palliative care). 
94 Bland, above n l, 364; President 's Commission For The Study of Ethical Problems In 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research Deciding To Forgo Life Sustaining 
Treatment March 1993 , 181. 
95 D Mendelson Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Withdrawal of Life Support Systems 
From Incompetent Patients Law , Medicine and Criminal Justice Conference (Australian 
Institute of Criminology , Canberra, 1993) 7. 
96 President 's Commission, above n 94 , 181. 
97 Bland, above n l , 361 ; I Freckelton "Withdrawal of Life Support : The ' Persistent 
Vegetative State ' Conundrum" (1993) l Journal of Law and Medicine 35 , 40 . 
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Anthony Bland could have no interest in further treatment or maintenance, nor 
in fact, any interests at all which could justify continued medical care. 
Therefore, the House of Lords held that invasive life-sustaining procedures 
could not lawfully be continued. The doctors had no right nor corresponding 
duty to continue the non-consensual regime and it had to be withdrawn. 98 
The House of Lord's use of necessity in these circumstances to exculpate 
doctors' conduct from criminal responsibility for culpable homicide represents a 
considerable extension of the doctrine. The Court authorised, not the 
application of treatment, but the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical care 
which would inevitably result in the patient's death. 
Conclusion: Necessity 
The doctrine of necessity is a useful tool for permitting doctors to treat the 
patient initially, and later withdraw treatment, allowing the patient to die 
without breaching their duties to the patient or the criminal law. It is cognisant 
of the PVS patient's lack of interests and indifference to further treatment. 
To summarise, the doctrine of necessity could be applied to future cases where 
doctors wish to withdraw life-sustaining regimes from PVS patients as follows: 
1) Necessity justifies treatment which is provided in the patient's best 
interests. 
2) PVS patients have no interests, they are totally indifferent to life and 
death. 
3) In the absence of interests there can be no justification for the invasive 
treatment. 
4) Therefore, the doctors are not entitled to continue the life-sustaining 
regimes, and they have no duty to do so. 
5) 
98 
Therefore, life-sustaining regimes, including artificial feeding, can 
lawfully be withdrawn. 
Bland, above n 1, 385 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson); 398 (per Lord Mustill). 
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It is appropriate now, to consider whether criminal liability will attach to the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from PVS patients. 
PART III 
CRIMIN AL LIABILITY 
If a doctor takes steps to end a patient's life, and is successful in his purpose, 
the conduct will be unlawful, implicating the criminal Jaw of homicide. It is 
well established that an altruistic motive would be irrelevant to a consideration 
of culpability. 99 The patient's consent to the doctor so acting is also irrelevant 
since a person cannot lawfully consent to her death. lOO Therefore, it is 
understandable why doctors may be hesitant to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment, be it artificial nutrition and hydration or antibiotics, from a 
PVS patient which would result in the patient's death. 101 
The crucial issue is whether withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining nutrition 
and hydration would constitute culpable homicide under the Crimes Act 1961. 
Homicide is defined as "the killing of a human being by another, directly or 
indirectly, by any means whatsoever." 102 Homicide will be an offence only if it 
is culpable within the terms of section 160 of the Act. If the killing is culpable 
then it may be murder under section 167 or section 168, and otherwise it is 
manslaughter. 103 Culpable homicide involves killing a person by an unlawful 
act or by an omission without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal 
duty_ 104 
99 Cantor, above n 72, 31; D Tribe and G Korgaonkar "Withdrawal of Medical 
Treatment" (l 992) Solicitors Journal 1192; I Kennedy "The Law Relating To The 
Treatment of the Terminally Ill" in Treat Me Right - Essays in Medical Law and Ethics 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 315, 321. 
100 Section 63 of the Crimes Act 1961. Furthermore, a doctor may be in breach of section 
179 of the Crimes Act 1961 if he aids or abets suicide. 
101 It is acknowledged that some health professionals are not concerned about criminal 
prosecution . They are reluctant to withdraw a nasogastric tube because they are not 
satisfied in themselves that that is the morally right thing to do. They want to be sure 
that it will not cause any further pain to family or medical staff. Dr R Worth, above n 
30. 
102 Section 158 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
103 Section 160(3) states that "Except as provided in section 178 of this Act, culpable 
homicide is either murder or manslaughter." Section 171 defines manslaughter as 
"culpable homicide not amounting to murder" (excluding infanticide). 
104 Section 160(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. 
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New Zealand Courts have not considered this issue to date. What follows is an 
examination of the approaches open to the court if it was asked to consider the 
legality of withdrawing of artificial nutrition and hydration from a PVS patient, 
and whether it would constitute culpable homicide. The House of Lords 
considered this issue for the first time in Bland. This landmark case will be 
analysed in an attempt to evaluate doctors' position in New Zealand. The 
strength of the House of Lords' decision and its conclusions will be tested here. 
The Approach: How To Consider Culpability 
The question which has received enormous attention from commentators 105 and 
was addressed for the first time by the House of Lords in Bland, is how can the 
humane withdrawal of maintenance-of-life regimes which result in the patient's 
death be distinguished from unlawful killing? To rationalise this distinction, 
attention has been focused on: the difference between acts of commission and 
acts of omission; the extent of doctors' duties to patients; and the issue of 
causation. 
Acts Of Commission And Acts Of Omission 
Traditionally, the law has drawn a distinction between acts of commission and 
acts of omission. This distinction supposes that intentionally doing something is 
somehow more culpable than allowing something to happen without 
interference. 106 People are held liable for all the adverse results of their 
commissions, but only some of their omissions . 
In the medical domain then, the law is considered to draw a crucial distinction 
between cases where the doctor omits to provide the patient with life-prolonging 
treatment and those where the doctor commits an act (i.e. administration of a 
lethal injection) to end the patient's life. 107 This distinction between actively 
killing a patient and making a clinical decision to allow a patient to die, has 
found expression in the phrase "letting nature take its course ", 108 which implies 
105 Kennedy , above n 99; I Kennedy "Switching Off Life-Support Machines : The Legal 
Implications" in Treat Me Right - Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Clarendon Press , 
Oxford, 1988) 349; H Beynon "Doctors as Murderers" (1982) Criminal Law Review 
17; PDG Skegg Law, Ethics, and Medicine - Studies In Medical Law (Clarendon Press , 
Oxford, 1988). 
106 H Kuhse the Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine - A Critique (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1987) 32-33. 
107 Bland, above n I, 368 . 
108 Cook, above n 52 , 157 . 
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that death resulted from the underlying condition rather than the doctor's 
conduct. 109 This explains why many doctors feel able to withhold antibiotic 
treatment (an omission) rather than withdraw "treatment" in the form of 
artificial feeding (a commission)· 110 
What is the reason for this distinction? 
In general , motive is seen as the moral distinction between acts and omissions . 
Someone who takes another person's life by some conduct designed with this 
primary intention is considered , morally, more blameworthy than someone who 
fails to save another. 111 This is not an accurate "moral evaluation" of doctors' 
intentions which are , generally, merciful whether treatment is removed or 
withheld. 112 Another reason for the distinction rests with society's general 
aversion to placing positive obligations on people towards strangers , and the 
difficulty in defining the extent of such obligations. 113 In some instances , 
however, the law imposes a duty on the person to act because of a special 
relationship between the parties . 114 
This legal and moral rule, that people have limited duties to save others is 
irrelevant in the medical domain because doctors are under a legal duty to use 
their skill, as far as possible , to benefit their patients, "and this duty removes 
any distinction between acts and omissions." 115 Failure to fulfil the duty will 
give rise to legal liability in the same way that an act of commission would . 
Clearly , the commission/omission dichotomy was not formulated with medical 
conduct in mind. 116 As a result it is a difficult distinction to apply . Advances 
in medical technology enable doctors to prolong a patient's life, and in many 
cases , death will not occur without a positive human act. For example, 
discontinuing life-sustaining nutrition and hydration from a PVS patient involves 
removing the naso-gastric tube and withholding food and fluids . Is this an act 
or an omission? How do you tell the difference? 
109 Cantor, above n 72 , 32. 
110 Dr R Worth , above n 30. 
111 President 's Commission, above n 94 , 66-67 . 
112 President 's Commission, above n 94 , 66-67. 
113 Cantor, above n 72 , 32 . 
114 For example, parents or guardians have a duty to provide their children with food , 
clothing and shelter, see Rex v Gibbons & Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App 134. 
115 President 's Commission, above n 94 , 66-67 . 
11 6 Cantor, above n 72 , 32 . 
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If this withdrawal is classified as a commission causing death, the doctor will 
probably be guilty of culpable homicide . If, however, it is classified as an 
omission, then the doctor will be criminally liable only if she had a duty to act. 
House of Lords application of commission/omission distinction 
The House of Lords decision in Bland illustrates the difficulties attendant on any 
attempt to categorise doctors' conduct as an act of commission or omission. 
The Law Lords held the doctors' discontinuance of the artificial feeding regime 
to be an omission. 117 In doing so , Lord Goff relied on Glanville Williams' 
suggestion that the doctor's conduct "is in substance not an act but an omission 
to struggle" and "the omission is not a breach of duty by the doctor, because he 
is not obliged to continue in a hopeless case .118 Williams supports his position 
with the following example: withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is no 
different from a failure to restart a machine which switches itself off 
automatically every 24 hours. 119 Failure to restart the machine was described 
as an omission. 
The House of Lords , were trying to distinguish Bland from R v Cox120 where a 
doctor was convicted of attempted murder after administering a lethal injection 
to his patient. 
So, the Law Lords decided it was impossible to distinguish withdrawing a naso-
gastric tube from withholding food and fluids or the non-initiation of the 
artificial feeding regime as this would introduce intolerably fine distinctions into 
the law. 121 The doctors were simply allowing the patient to die by refraining 
from providing treatment which might prevent death. Therefore , the withdrawal 
was considered an omission and lawful provided no duty was breached. 122 
117 Bland, above n 1, 369; 384; 398. 
118 G Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (2 ed, Stevens and Sons , London, 1983) 282 . 
119 Above n 118, 282 . See also comments by Beynon , above n 105, 20 . 
120 R v Cox [1993] 1 WLR 188 . 
121 Bland, above n 1, 369; 384. See also Barber v Superior Court of State of California 
195 Cal Rptr 484 , 491 (1983). 
122 Bland, above nl , 369. See also GP Fletcher "Prolonging Life" (1966) 42 Washington 
Law Review 999; H Beynon "Doctors as Murderers " (1982) Criminal Law Review 17 . 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Law Lords' categorisation of the doctors' 
conduct is unstable , and an acute deviation from common English usage. 123 
Removing a naso-gastric tube clearly involves affirmative conduct, but common 
sense tells us that a doctor should not be guilty of culpable homicide on this 
ground alone. It is too simplistic to suggest that the difference between killing 
and letting die rests on the distinction between physically performing an action 
like withdrawing a naso-gastric tube which results in death , and not performing 
an act like administering antibiotics or feeding through the tube which would 
have prevented death. 124 
There is no morally relevant distinction in this situation between bodily 
movement and the absence of it. Indeed some omissions leading to death would 
be considered equally blameworthy as acts. In some instances, as already noted , 
the law recognises people's moral obligation to act by imposing legal duties to 
do so , making an omission as culpable as an act. 125 
The traditional commission/omission approach to liability should be abandoned 
in this area . There is no morally significant difference between commissions 
and omission. Categorising doctors ' conduct results in the use of pure semantics 
and unacceptable distortions of language . 
Practical Implications Of The Act/Omission Approach 
Thomas J in the AHB case was able to provide the community with workable 
guidelines , avoiding the need for future judicial intervention in decisions to 
discontinue life-sustaining procedures because of his approach to the issue of 
culpable homicide. His Honour simply considered whether the doctors had a 
lawful excuse to discontinue artificial feeding , then proceeded to clarify the law 
in respect of the legal cause of death after medically indicated cessation of life-
sustaining procedures . 126 This approach is considerably different to that of the 
House of Lords in Bland. 
123 I Kennedy "Switching Off the Life-Suppon Machines: The Legal Implications" in 
Treat Me Right - Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Clarendon Press , Oxford , l 988) 
349 , 351. 
124 Kuhse , above n 106, 42-43; Cantor, above n 72 , 32-33 ; Bioethics Research Centre, 
above n 6 , 34 . 
125 For example, sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Crimes Act 1961 . 
126 Mendelson, above n 95 , 13 . 
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The Law Lords127 became so entangled in commissions/omissions semantics 
they were unable to clearly indicate to doctors when life-sustaining nutrition and 
hydration may be withdrawn without fear of criminal prosecution. 128 
Therein lies the major practical difference between the House of Lords' decision 
and the New Zealand High Court decision: 129 
Since, in the [United Kingdom], the whole edifice of legality of medical decision-
making in respect of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment depends upon the court's 
categorisation of the doctor's conduct in each particular case, the law is no more certain 
now than it was before the Bland case. 
Despite its stated objective, of deciding, under the existing law, in which 
circumstances doctors can lawfully withdraw treatment, independently of the 
court's intervention, the House of Lords' categorisation of doctors' conduct 
means that doctors in England must continue to apply to the Court for 
declaratory relief prior to removing artificial nutrition and hydration. 130 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson acknowledged this when he said: 131 
I am very conscious that I have reached my conclusion on narrow, legalistic grounds 
which provide no satisfactory basis for the decision of cases which will arise in the 
future where the facts are not identical . . . I therefore consider that, for the foreseeable 
future, doctors would be well advised in each case to apply to the court for a declaration 
as to the legality of any proposed discontinuance of life-support where there has been no 
valid consent by or on behalf of the patient to such discontinuance. 
It has been suggested that the House of Lords' approach to the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining nutrition and hydration is "implicitly mistrustful of the 
professional autonomy of medical personnel." 132 This, it is argued is evidenced 
by Lord Lowry' s articulation of the Law Lords desire to keep medical decision-
making under judicial scrutiny when he said: 133 
Procedurally I can see no present alternative to an application to the court such as that 
made in the present case ... [In] the absence of an application, the doctor who proposes 
the cessation of life-supporting care and treatment on the ground that their continuance 
would not be in the patient's best interest will have reached that conclusion himself and 
will be judge in his own cause unless and until his chosen course of action is challenged 
in criminal or civil proceedings. 
127 Except, it seems, Lord Keith of Kinkel. 
128 M Puxon "Mercy Without Certainty" ( 1992) 340 The Lancet 1343. 
129 Mendelson, above n 95, 11. 
130 Mendelson, above n 95, 11-12. 
131 Bland, above n 6, 387; see also Lord Keith of Kinkel at 363, and Lord Goff of 
Chieveley at 376-377. 
132 Mendelson, above n 95, 15. 
133 Bland, above n 1, 378 . 
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For the reasons given, it is more than apparent that the issuance of guidelines is 
eminently more suitable than an approach which requires continued judicial 
intervention in the medical domain. 134 
The Duty Approach 
After its extensive use of semantics, the House of Lords addressed the real issue 
on which liability turned, whether or not the doctors would breach their duty 
owed to the patient in good faith. Lord Goff recognised that the true distinction 
between discontinuing life-support and administering a lethal injection does not 
emanate from the commission/ omission distinction but from the limits of a 
doctor's duty. He stated that: 135 
[W]hereas the law considers that discontinuance of life support may be consistent with 
the doctor 's duty to care for his patient, it does not, for reasons of policy, consider that 
it forms any part of his duty to give his patient a lethal injection to put him out of his 
agony . 
The determative legal factor is the extent of the doctors' duty to the patient. 136 
This will dictate the lawfulness of the conduct. If the conduct forms no part of 
the doctor's duty then it will be unlawful, irrespective of whether it is an act or 
omission. 
Therefore, an examination of doctors' duty is a useful means of judging the 
lawfulness of conduct. Where a doctor omits to provide or continue 
maintenance-of-life regimes, precipitating the patient's death, she may face 
criminal prosecution if she breached her duty to care for the patient in good 
faith. 137 Medical ethics and societal values are reflected in the principle of 
good faith, "so that, to cause the patient's death, ... by omission or commission 
would be a breach of [this] duty ... , and hence unlawful". 13~ However, ethics 
and societal values both recognise that in certain cases, it is acceptable to let the 
patient die and therefore permits the withdrawal of life-maintaining regimes. 
134 Dr R Worth indicated to the Biological and Medical Issues Committee of the New 
Zealand Law Society , that in his opinion, there is a general feeling amongst doctors that 
medical decisions should be made by members of the medical profession and not by the 
Courts . To ensure that doctors can do this without fear of liability , he indicated that, 
doctors want clear guidelines as to the legality of removing a naso-gastric tube in the 
PVS . See above n 30 . 
135 Bland, above n 1, 369. 
136 Cantor, above n 72 , 33 ; I Kennedy "The Law Relating to the Treatment of the 
Terminally Ill" , above n 99 , 322 . 
137 Kennedy , above n 99 , 321 -3 ; Cantor. above n 72, 33 . 
138 Kennedy , above n 99, 322 . 
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Kennedy considers an analysis of conduct's lawfulness in terms of duties to be 
morally and legally preferable. 139 It assures doctors that withdrawing 
"treatment" is morally acceptable not simply because they did not kill the 
patient, but because they are not required to pursue life above all else , and 
continue futile medical procedures. 
Furthermore, a judicial decision which incorporates the duty approach would not 
rest on tenuous legal distinctions . It would clarify whether doctors would be 
criminally responsible for the withdrawal of "treatment" by delineating the 
boundaries of the medical duty to treat patients in hopeless and irreversible 
conditions. 
Like the House of Lords , Thomas Jin the AHB case examined the boundaries of 
the medial duty to provide treatment to assess the lawfulness of withdrawing of 
life-sustaining treatment. However, His Honour embarked upon this analysis 
immediately without categorising the proposed conduct as an omission. The 
lawfulness of the doctors' conduct in AHB was determined by reference to the 
doctors medical duty and lawful excuse as governed by good medical practice . 
Respectfully, this approach to the issue of liability for culpable homicide is 
preferable to that of the House of Lords'. Advances in modem medical practice 
have created unique legal and ethical problems for doctors. Life and death 
decisions in the medical arena do not fit neatly into traditional legal categories . 
The duty approach is flexible and accommodates changes in the medical field . 
Cause Of Death 
Causation offers a further basis on which to exculpate doctors discontinuing life-
maintaining procedures. Causation is the sine qua non of liability. Criminal 
responsibility for murder or manslaughter will attach to doctors' conduct only if 
the conduct caused (or accelerated) the patient 's death. Therefore, if the 
patient's death is attributed legally to the underlying condition, legal liability 
will not attach to the conduct. 140 
139 Kennedy , above n 99 , 322. 
140 Mendelson, above n 95, 2; I Kennedy "Switching Off Life-Support Machines ", above n 
105 , 360; PDG Skegg "The Termination of Artificial Ventilation" in Law Ethics and 
Medicine - Studies in Medical Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford , 1988) 161 , 165 . 
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A persuasive argument can be advanced that withdrawal of artificial feeding will 
not cause (or accelerate) death. 141 The argument's cogency is linked to its 
simplicity: 
Where the PVS patient's condition is irreversible and hopeless, artificial 
feeding is no longer medically justifiable. If artificial feeding is 
withdrawn, the patient's death will be caused by the underlying 
condition, because it is the PVS which prevents the patient from eating 
and sustaining her vital functions. Therefore the doctors' conduct will 
not cause the patient's death, and they cannot be guilty of culpable 
homicide. 
This argument is consistent with the widely held belief that compliance with a 
patient's instructions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment will not constitute 
suicide or homicide. 142 The patient's refusal of further treatment and its 
subsequent withdrawal allows nature to take its course and death is considered to 
be the result of the underlying disease. Different conclusions may well have 
been drawn, however, if treatment was withdrawn in these cases without the 
patient's express consent. 
Several other cases also confirm that the withdrawal of life-support systems are 
not the cause of death, although this was done in the context of a criminal 
prosecution charging a third party with murder. 143 Despite the fact that the 
doctors were not on trial and the culpability of their conduct was not in 
question, it is interesting that the Courts invariably assumed that the decision to 
terminate life-support was within the doctor's field of competence. 144 
It may be argued that these cases involved the removal of a ventilator and as 
such are distinguishable because death was not inevitable. The patient might 
continue to breathe unaided. If she does not, then it is most probably because 
the underlying disease process prevents the body functioning normally . Where 
141 A variation of this argument was advanced by Counsel for the second plaintiff in the 
AHB case, above n 3, 248 . See also Bland, above n 1, 331, where Sir Stephen Brown 
stated that the true cause of Anthony Bland's death would be the massive injuries which 
he sustained at the football stadium disaster . 
142 Nancy B, above n 56; In Re Quinlan , above n 69 , In Re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209, 
(1985) . 
143 See R v Malcherek [1981] l WLR 690, 694-5. In R v Trounson [1991] 3 NZLR 690 , 
696, the Court of Appeal considered section 166 of the Crimes Act 1961, and stated 
that the discontinuance of life support was not a new or intervening cause. 
144 AHB, above n 3, 252. 
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food and fluids are withdrawn, however , there is no doubt about the patient's 
fate . 145 How then, can it be argued that the removal of food and fluids would 
not cause death, when death is so inevitable, and the whole purpose of the 
removal is to bring about the patient's death? 
The underlying disease , it is suggested, does not proceed to death , but a new, 
intervening cause - dehydration and malnutrition - is introduced. 146 The fallacy 
of this argument can be exposed by considering the reason for artificial feeding . 
Artificial feeding must be provided in order to maintain the patient because the 
PVS has impeded the patient's ability to eat. If artificial feeding is foregone , 
then the patient will die because of his inability to eat, which is a result of the 
underlying condition. Brock postulated that: 147 
It would seem to be only when the patient 's human ability to take nutrition is 
unimpaired, and a decision is then made not to sustain life , and so to stop feeding , that 
a new fatal process is introduced as opposed to withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment 
and letting the disease process proceed to death. 
This approach is useful for distinguishing unlawful killing from lawful conduct 
which allows a patient to die . For example, the case of Rex v Gibbins and 
Proctor148 is distinguishable on this basis , from a doctor 's bona fide withdrawal 
of artificial feeding from a PVS patient. In the Gibbins case, the accused were 
convicted of murder because they failed to fulfil a fundamental duty to a child in 
their care; they did not feed her. The otherwise healthy child starved to death. 
Therefore , the accuseds' failure introduced a fatal process which caused the 
death . Whereas , in the case of a PVS patient , the underlying condition is the 
fatal process , which was not introduced by the doctors . 
Determining liability on the basis of the connection between the conduct and the 
result renders a common sense solution in most cases. It does not require courts 
to manipulate the concept of causation, since the doctor 's act would not, in fact , 
145 D W Brock "Forgoing Life-Sustaining Food and Water: Is it Killing?" in J Lynn (ed) 
By No Extraordinary Means: The Choice To Forgo Life-Sustaining Food and Water 
(Indiana University Press , Bloomington, 1989) 117, 123-4. 
146 Brock, above n 145 , 124. 
147 Brock, above n 145, 124-125. 
148 ( 1918) 13 Cr App 134 . 
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be the cause of death. 149 If the conduct and the result are not connected, then 
the accused will not be guilty of culpable homicide, irrespective of the bona 
fides of the conduct. 150 
AHB - Approach To Causation 
The Court in AHB, rejected this simplistic test because it would exculpate 
doctors who failed to observe good medical practice by inappropriately 
terminating treatment from a patient whose life was sustainable. 151 The futility 
of the treatment in one case and the ability to sustain life in another would not 
be a relevant difference when causation is in issue. 152 
To combat this difficulty, the concept of causation requires manipulation in 
order that the courts may hold blameworthy conduct to be the cause of death but 
exculpate morally justifiable conduct resulting in death. The critical question is: 
under what circumstances will the courts consider a doctor to be legally justified 
in withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration, and not legally the cause of 
death? Commentators have devised rationale, based on causation, which 
purportedly justify doctors' removal of life-maintaining procedures in cases 
where the patient's condition is hopeless, but not in cases where life is 
sustainable. 153 These rationale were not accepted by the Court in AHB. 
Instead Thomas J clarified the issue by reference to the medical duty of care and 
lawful excuse: 154 
If the doctor is not under a legal duty to provide or continue with the life-support 
system, or he has a "lawful excuse" for discontinuing it, it may then be said that he or 
she has not legally caused the death of the patient. 
If the two primary conditions are met, the withdrawal would not be the cause of 
death as a matter of law. Both conditions depend on whether or not the doctor 
acted in accordance with good medical practice. 
149 PDG Skegg "Drugs Hastening Death" in Law Ethics and Medicine - Studies in Law and 
Medicine (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 121, 136 . 
150 See R v Cox, above n 120, where the charge was reduced from murder to attempted 
murder because of the inability to prove the connection between the doctor's act and 
death . 
151 AHB, above n 3, 248 and 254. 
152 AHB, above n 3, 248. 
153 Kennedy , above n 123, 360-361 ("non-blameworthy cause "). Skegg, above n 140, 166 
("medical practice considered proper in the circumstances "). 
154 AHB, above n 3, 249 . 
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A Return To Duty 
Under all the approaches outlined, it is necessary to consider the parameters of 
the doctor's duty. Section 151(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 (the Act) establishes 
these parameters. Section 164 of the Act is also pertinent to the issue of 
causation, and it will be addressed later. Neither section 151(1) nor section 164 
create an offence in their own right. Their function is to assist in defining the 
term "killing" in section 158 and in determining the culpability of the "killing" 
for the purposes of section 160. Section 151 ( 1) will now be addressed in order 
to ascertain the parameters of a doctor's duty to continue artificial feeding 
regimes. 
Section 151 Of The Crimes Act 1961 
Section 151(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 attempts to ensure that people in the care 
of others receive basic care by imposing a legal duty on those responsible to 
supply dependants with necessaries of life. The section states: 
151. Duty to Provide the Necessaries of Life - (1) Every one who has charge of 
any other person unable, by reason of detention, age, sickness, insanity, or any other 
cause, to withdraw himself from such charge, and unable to provide himself with the 
necessaries of life, is (whether such charge is undertaken by him under any contract or 
is imposed upon him by law or by reason of his unlawful act or otherwise howsoever) 
under a legal duty to supply that person with the necessaries of life, and is criminally 
responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to perform such duty if the death of that 
person is caused, or his life is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such 
omission. 
The section clearly applies to a doctor-patient relationship, where the patient is 
admitted for hospital care. 155 There also can be no doubt that food and water 
are necessaries of life without which the patient would die. As such, their 
provision forms part of a person's fundamental duty to those in his or her 
care. 156 However, PVS patients are unable to eat, and consequently receive 
their nutrition via a nasogastric tube. Therefore, the question is whether the 
provision of nutrition and hydration by artificial means is a necessary of life. 
A distinction has been drawn between the provision of food by ordinary means 
and by artificial means. Overwhelming medical opinion worldwide regards 
155 AHB. above n 3. 249. 
l56 Rex v Gibbins & ProCior (l9l8) l3 Cr Appl l34 . 
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artificial feeding as medical treatment. 157 The House of Lords in Bland 
followed medical opinion. Furthermore, tube feeding requires the application of 
a medical technique which may need to be administered under the supervision of 
qualified health professionals. 158 Therefore, even if tube feeding is not strictly 
medical treatment, it is a medical procedure which forms part of the patient's 
medical care. 
Despite its label of medical treatment and care, the withdrawal of artificial 
feeding is "an extremely psychologically difficult thing for many health care 
professionals to do". 159 The notion of withdrawing such elementary support is 
contrary to every health professionals' training - to care for people. 
It has been countered, that irrespective of how it is provided, food and water are 
essential to all people, well or ill; it is basic care and a fundamental expression 
of equal concern and respect. 160 Their provision is "symbolic" of care, 
compassion, and humanity, as eating is a basic human activity which sustains 
life. 161 However, the symbolic significance of feeding dwindles when its 
purpose and the context of its provision are considered. Life is sustained by 
artificial feeding to enable other medical treatment which facilitate recovery to 
be administered. But permanently vegetative patients will not recover, and the 
benefits of feeding are doubtful. 
Resistance to the withdrawal of artificial feeding may also stem from the 
resultant "starvation death". The word "starvation" and the description of its 
effects conjures a revolting picture, suggesting that the patient endures a painful, 
gruesome death. 162 The inaccuracy of this view has been widely criticised. 163 
157 Bland, above n l, 362; 372. See also Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 38. See 
also In Re J (A Minor) (Wardship & Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, 41 for other 
ramifications of this finding. 
158 Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 38. 
159 P W Armstrong and B D Colen, above n 39, 40; J E Ruark, T A Raffin and the 
Stanford University Medical Centre Committee on Ethics "Initiating and Withdrawing 
Life Support" (1988) 318 The New England Journal of Medicine 25, 27. 
160 A Fisher "The Road to Euthanasia" (1993) The Tablet 235, 236. 
161 R E Cranford "Patients with Permanent Loss of Consciousness" in J Lynn (ed) By No 
Extra-Ordinary Means: The Choice to Forgo Life-Sustaining Food and Water (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 1989) 186, 191; Institute of Medical Ethics, Working 
Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death "Withdrawal of Life-
Support From Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State" (1991) 337 The Lancet 96, 97 . 
162 Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital Inc 497 NE 2d 626 (1986); In Re Jobes 529 A 
2d 434 ( 1987); See also J C Ahronheim and M R Gasner "The Sloganism of Starvation" 
( l 990) 335 The Lancet 278; Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 7. 
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Despite the manifestations of starvation, PVS patients are thought to be unable 
to experience or perceive pain and suffering. 164 In the absence of this capacity, 
there could be "no perception of what the conscious patient would describe as 
hunger or thirst". 165 Furthermore , only artificial feeding is withdrawn, 
palliative care continues . Therefore , "the cruelty and abandonment implied in 
the word 'starvation' are not relevant to the dying [PVS] patient" . 166 
The courts have frequently held necessaries of life to include medical treatment 
and care. 167 In these cases, the medical intervention was necessary to "prevent, 
cure or alleviate a disease [which] threatened life or health. "168 Consequently , 
the Court in AHB considered the provision of artificial life support to be a 
necessary of life where it was required to "prevent, cure or alleviate" the 
condition. 169 Where the patient is surviving by virtue only of the mechanical 
means, the life support should not be construed as a necessary of life. 
Similarly, the House of Lords in Bland considered that the doctors were not 
under a legal duty to provide artificial nutrition and hydration if the procedure 
was futile. 170 Lord Goff came to this conclusion by drawing an analogy 
between the function of nasogastric feeding and ventilatory support. Since they 
both provide a form of "life support" , the same principles could be applied to 
decide whether artificial feeding could lawfully be discontinued. 
However, an obvious difference between the two forms of "life support" is their 
physical appearance. A nasogastric tube is not an advanced, expensive piece of 
medical machinery , it is merely a tube which facilitates feeding . It is 
understandable why health professionals may feel more responsible for the 
patient's death after the withdrawal of artificial feeding 171 than after the 
removal of a host of machines which more obviously sustain life . 
163 Ahronheim et al, above n 162; Armstrong et al, above n 39, 40; D Brahams "The 
Reluctant Survivor" (1990) 140 NU 639; Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6 . 7 ; B 
Jennett "Letting Vegetative Patients Die" (1992) 305 BMJ 1305 . 
164 See above discussion on the PVS. 
165 Armstrong et al , above n 39, 40 ; Bland, above n 1, 373. 
166 Ahronheim et al , above n 162, 279 . 
167 R v Burney (1958] NZLR 745 (Medical care and hospital treatment); R v Moore [1954] 
NZLR 893 (Medical attention); see also AHB, above n 3, 249 . 
168 AHB, above n 3, 249 ; R v Tutton (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 129; see also D B Collins 
Medical La.win New Zealand (Brooker and Friend, Wellington 1992), 193-4 . 
169 AHB, above n3 , 249. 
170 Bland, above n 1, 362; 372-373 ; 386; 398 . 
l 71 Dr R Worth , above n 30 . 
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Nevertheless, Bland provides highly persuasive authority for the argument that 
artificial is not a necessary of life because it will not prevent, cure or alleviate 
irreversible PVS . Artificial feeding in itself could not cure the condition, it 
would simply alleviate the effects of the condition long enough to enable 
recovery . Where there is no hope for recovery , and the patient survives by 
virtue only of the artificial feeding regime, continued medical intervention is 
futile and medically unjustifiable. Consequently doctors should not be under a 
legal duty to continue artificial feeding , and their omission to do so should not 
carry criminal responsibility . 
Lawfal Excuse 
Even if doctors are considered to owe a duty to the patient to continue artificial 
feeding , they may for the purposes of section 151(1) be legally justified in 
discontinuing the maintenance-of-life regime, if the doctors had a "lawful 
excuse" for so acting. 
In hopeless , irreversible cases of PVS , there is no medical justification for 
continued medical intervention and the purposes of medicine will be frustrated if 
doctors are required to maintain life-sustaining regimes. Although continued 
maintenance is lawful , doctors should have a lawful excuse for its 
discontinuance if this accords with good medical practice . 172 It would be 
unreasonable to hold doctors , following good medical practice, criminally 
responsible in terms of section 151 . 
What then, constitutes good medical practice? Reference to the fundamental 
duty attendant on the doctor-patient relationship is the most useful start point. 
This immediately indicates that neither law nor medical-ethics impose a duty to 
prolong life - or to defer death - where "there is no reasonable possibility of the 
patient emerging from her (unconscious) condition to a cognitive , sapient 
state" . 173 Indeed it was the futility of the medical procedures that decided the 
matter in the Bland case . Furthermore, a doctor's fundamental duty requires 
her to treat the patient in accordance with her best clinical judgment (i .e . in 
good faith and in accordance with good medical practice) .174 If, in the doctor's 
bona fide clinical judgment, the situation is hopeless, and treatment should be 
172 AHB, above n 3, 250 . 
173 In Re Quinlan , above n 69 ; AHB, above n 3, 251 ; Barber, above n 84 ; Mendelson, 
above n 95 , 14 ; Kennedy , above n 123 , 361 -367; Williams , above n 8, 279 . 
174 In Re 1, above n 69, provides persuasive support for this position . 
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withdrawn, to require the doctor to act to the contrary would be "wholly 
inconsistent with the law." 175 This realistic approach should be, and most 
probably will be adopted in relation to the withdrawal of artificial feeding from 
PVS patients . 
After considering these factors, Thomas J in AHB concluded that good medical 
practice would exist if the following criteria are fulfilled: 176 
1) That the doctor's decision to withdraw or withhold the life-sustaining 
treatment must be bona fide and in the patient's best interests. 
2) That the decision "encompasses prevailing medical standards, practices, 
procedures and traditions which command general approval within the 
medical profession. " 
3) That the medical profession's recognised ethical body is consulted and 
approves the decision. 
4) That the patient's immediate family 177 or guardian gives fully informed 
consent to the decision. 
The utility of the patient's best interests decision-making basis, in relation to 
PVS patients is doubted 178 and this aspect of good medical practice should be 
omitted. Doctors would simply be required to make a bona fide clinical 
judgment whether treatment should be continued, and this must accord with 
objective medical opinion. 179 
The withdrawal of artificial feeding should be permitted on the same basis as the 
withdrawal of ventilatory support. If doctors comply with the criteria for good 
medical practice they should, and probably would, have a lawful excuse in 
terms of section 151. 
Therefore, criminal responsibility should not attach to the doctor's withdrawal 
of artificial feeding, because the doctor's conduct was not legally the cause of 
175 In Ref, above n 69. 
176 AHB, above n 3, 251. 
177 "Family" would need to be defined in a culturally sensitive fashion . 
178 See later discussion of Patient 's Best Interests . 
179 This is consistent with the recommendation by che Issues Committee, above n 23 , 3. 
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death. This argument would not be available to an interloper discontinuing the 
life-sustaining regime or a doctor not acting bona fide. 
Section 164 - Acceleratwn of Death 
There is one further section of the Crimes Act 1961 which is pertinent to the 
issue of liability for culpable homicide. It is section 164, which concerns 
acceleration of death . 
Section 164 codifies a principle of law under which a person may be responsible 
for the death of another if the bodily injury caused by the person hastens death, 
notwithstanding that the conduct would not have killed if the victim had not 
been labouring under some condition. 180 The section reads: 
164. Acceleration of Death - Every one who by any act or omission causes the 
death of another person kills that person, although the effect of the bodily injury caused 
to that person was merely to hasten his death while labouring under some disorder or 
disease arising from some other cause. 
Prima facie , section 164 seems to encompass the withdrawal of artificial 
feeding, because the patient will die when death would not have otherwise 
occurred. For section 164 to be invoked, it must be shown that the accuseds' 
conduct was a contributory cause of the victim's death. 181 The conduct need 
not be the substantial or only cause of death, but it must be more than a trivial 
or de minimus contribution. 182 The vital issue is what caused the victim's 
death . 183 
Common law cases establishing the principle codified by section 164 include R v 
Burdee .184 This case concerned an elderly woman who was persuaded to fast 
for three days, in an attempt to cure her rheumatism. The woman died whilst 
fasting . A post mortem examination revealed that she had been suffering from a 
heart condition. At the trial, medical evidence indicated that the fasting 
accelerated the heart failure , which resulted in death . The person was convicted 
of manslaughter. On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, and reaffirmed 
that acceleration of death by improper medical treatment may readily constitute 
manslaughter . 
180 Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker and Friend, Wellington, 1993) ll-28 . 
181 Garrow & Turkington Criminal Law (Butterworths , Wellington, 1991) 257; Collins 
above n 54, 192 . 
182 Collins , above n 54, 192 ; Garrow & Turkington, above n 181 ; 257 . 
183 R v Henningan [1971] 3 ALL ER 133 . 
184 R v Burdee (1916) 86 LJ KB 871. 
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Applicability of section 164 
The Court in AHB considered section 164, and much of its reasoning 1s 
applicable to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from PVS 
patients. Most importantly, the AHB case clarifies the application of section 164 
and it supports the conclusion that doctors acting in accordance with good 
medical practice should not be considered to have accelerated the patient's 
death. 
To begin with, it is doubtful whether section 164 would be applicable at all. 
The conclusions reached earlier, regarding causation, under section 151 are 
pertinent here. Secondly, the purpose of section 164 is to assist in determining 
whether or not the accused "killed" the person in terms of section 158 and 
section 160. If there is no unlawful act causing death in terms of section 160, 
then section 164 will be of little relevance because a vital element of culpable 
homicide has not been established. 
The lawfulness of the withdrawal can be determined by reference to the doctor's 
duty to continue the medical regime. It has been argued that doctors should not 
be under a duty to continue artificial feeding in futile case, and, they should 
have a lawful excuse for withdrawing the regime. Then, providing they have 
acted in accordance with good medical practice, the act of withdrawing artificial 
feeding would not be an "unlawful act" for the purposes of section 160. 
Bodily injury 
For section 164 to apply, the doctors must have inflicted some bodily injury on 
the patient which hastened death. Will the withdrawal of artificial feeding 
inflict bodily injury on the patient? It is doubtful. The removal of ventilatory 
support was not considered to constitute an infliction of bodily injury. 185 To do 
so would strain the natural and ordinary meaning of "bodily injury". A 
ventilator simply mechanically ventilates a patient's body, and the act of 
discontinuing this process does not inflict bodily injury. 186 
185 AHB, above n 3, 254. 
186 ARB, above n 3, 254. 
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The same reasoning should be applied to the withdrawal of artificial feeding. A 
nasogastric tube provides food in the same way that a ventilator provides air. 
Removing the tube will not by itself inflict "bodily injury", it will simply 
prevent further feeding by artificial means. Therefore, it is submitted that no 
bodily injury will be caused, notwithstanding the fact that as the body expires, it 
will exhibit the unpleasant effects of starvation and dehydration, which may 
sustain damage to bodily organs. 187 
"Hastens his death" 
The most problematic aspect of section 164 is the phrase "hastens his death". A 
PVS patient's death would seem to be hastened by the removal of artificial 
feeding because the patient may otherwise have continued to live. The death 
happened at the time it did because of the doctor's conduct. 188 
The observations made by Devlin J in R v Adams189 are helpful here. His 
Honour contended that where doctor's conduct resulted in premature death, 
common sense would indicate that the illness and not the doctor was the cause of 
the death. 
[People] would suggest the cause of her death was the illness or the injury . .. which 
brought her into hospital, and the proper medical treatment that is administered and that 
has an incidental effect of determining the exact moment of death, or may have, is not 
the cause of death in any sensible use of the term. 190 
The facts in R v Burdee are somewhat analogous to the case under 
consideration. To avoid the conclusion that the doctor's conduct hastened death, 
Burdee will have to be distinguished. This is possible because the phrase, 
hastens death, has been interpreted narrowly, and considered inapplicable to 
doctors who "in accordance with good medical practice, withdraw treatment 
which no longer serves any therapeutic or medical purpose." 191 Consequently, 
if artificial feeding fulfils no medical purpose, and its withdrawal complies with 
good medical practice, doctors should not be considered to have hastened the 
patient's death. Therefore, it is unlikely that section 164 will be applicable, or 
if it is, that it would fix the doctors with criminal responsibility. 
187 See AHB, above n 3, 254. 
188 D Cook, above n 52, 159. 
189 [ 19571 Criminal Law Review 365. 
190 Above n 189. 
191 AHB, above n 3, 255. 
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Conclusion On Liability 
It has been shown that doctors should not be held criminally responsible for 
withdrawing artificial feeding on the following grounds. Doctors should not be 
under a duty to continue futile treatment, and they should have a lawful excuse 
if they withdraw artificial feeding in accordance with good medical practice . 
Consequently , they should not be considered to have caused or accelerated the 
patient's death as a matter of law. 
PART IV 
CRITERIA FOR GOVERNING DECISIONS TO WITHDRAW ARTIFICIAL 
FEEDING 
In light of the conclusion reached in this paper, that life-sustaining nutrition and 
hydration may lawfully be withdrawn from patients in a permanently vegetative 
state, the question which must now be addressed is: what criteria or standard 
should govern the decision to withdraw life-sustaining procedures from PVS 
patients whose treatment wishes are not known? 
Three alternatives will be considered: patient's best interests, substituted 
judgment and good medical practice. There may be some overlap between the 
criteria available and several parties may be involved in the decision. 
Patient's Best Interests Approach 
In its pristine form, the patient's best interest test requires the decision-maker to 
balance the "benefits" and "burdens" of treatment, and to make a decision which 
will confer the greatest net benefit on the patient. 192 Theoretically, the inquiry 
focuses on the patient's contemporaneous interest. 
In Bland, the House of Lords adopted the patient's best interests approach as the 
basis for deciding whether continued medical intervention was justified. Lord 
Goff considered that the "patient's best interests" did not place the doctors under 
an obligation to prolong the patient's life by every means available to them, 
regardless of the patient's quality of life . 193 He stated that: 194 
192 R Dresser, above n 63, 383. 
l 93 In Re J , above n 69. followed. 
19--+ Bland, above n I, 370-37 l. 
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[If] the justification for treating a patient who lacks the capacity to consent lies in the 
fact that the treatment is provided in his best interest, it must follow that the treatment 
may, and indeed ultimately should, be discontinued where it is no longer in his best 
interests to provide it. The question which lies at the hean of the present case is, as I 
see it , whether on that principle the doctors responsible for the treatment and care of 
Anthony Bland can justifiably discontinue the process of anificial feeding upon which 
the prolongation of his life depends . 
Do PVS patients have interests? 
In adopting the patient's best interests approach, the House of Lords overlooked 
one vital question: do PVS patients have interests? It is submitted that they 
have no discernible interests on which treatment decisions can be made. 
Where a diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness or "permanent" vegetative 
state has been made, then the patient, by definition, will not experience any of 
the benefits or burdens of continued medical treatment which the patient's best 
interests test is designed to balance. 195 It is thought that PVS patients are 
unable to experience pain and suffering, 196 or any other human emotion. 
Disability is total; and there is no possibility of a return to even minimal social 
functioning. 197 The only interests the patient may have in being maintained are 
the possibility of misdiagnoses or cure . These possibilities are so remote that 
they would not tip the balance in favour of continued maintenance. 198 
Lord Keith was disconcerted by the argument that Anthony Bland' s best interests 
favoured discontinuance of the treatment. 199 His Lordship thought it impossible 
to make a value judgment in the case of a PVS patient, unlike the case of a 
195 In Re Peter 529 A 2d 419 , 425 (1987) . It is acknowledged that some may disagree with 
this conclusion, and it may not be possible to generalise about PVS patients and whether 
they have interests . 
196 AMA, above n 15. The Biological and Medical Issues Committee have indicated that 
this assumption , sometimes stated as fact , is not true for all PVS patients . It was 
advised by II a prominent neurosurgeon that a small minority of patients in a (persistent) 
vegetative state exhibit symptoms such as elevated heart rate and spasms which can be 
alleviated by painkillers . 11 Above n 23, 2 . 
197 President 's Commission, above n 94, 182; Cranford , above n 13, 28 . 
198 R Dresser, above n 63 , 384; President 's Commission, above n 94 ; Shapiro , above n 33 , 
44 7-448 ; Cranford indicated that patients who regained consciousness after three 
months in the vegetative state suffered severe and permanent mental and physical 
disability . Above n 13 , 29 . 
199 Bland. above n 1, 361 . 
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sensate patient, 200 because his irreversible lack of consciousness left him 
indifferent to all treatment decisions. Lord Keith opined: 201 
In the case of a permanently insensate being, who if continuing to live would never 
experience the slightest actual discomfort , it is difficult, if not impossible, to make any 
relevant comparison between continued existence and the absence of it. It is, however, 
perhaps permissible to say that to an individual with no cognitive capacity whatever, 
and no prospect of ever recovering any such capacity in this world , it must be a matter 
of complete indifference whether he lives or dies . 
Therefore, it is apparent that the patient's best interests concept which imposes a 
positive obligation to do what is most conducive to the patient's good, is not a 
particularly useful concept for guiding decisions in cases where patients have no 
discernible interests . It is simply inapplicable to individuals in a permanent 
vegetative state. 202 
House of Lords application of the patients best interest test 
The irrelevance of the patient's best interests standard to PVS patients was 
clearly demonstrated when the House of Lord utilised it to decide Anthony 
Bland's future. Account was taken of the invasiveness of the treatment, the 
indignity the patient was subjected to, and Lord Goff also included the family's 
distress as a relevant factor to be balanced. 203 
Respectfully, the decision illustrates conceptual confusion in the application of 
the test. 204 Instead of balancing the benefits and burdens for the patient in 
question, interests of a "reasonable person" in the patient's situation were 
considered. This was inevitable in Bland, because Anthony Bland was 
completely indifferent to continued maintenance . Consequently , a decision was 
made reflecting what a II reasonable person II in the patient's situation would 
want, under the guise of the patient's best interests . 205 
Lord Mustill, on the other hand, explicitly excluded certain factors from 
consideration including the family's distress , the strain on medical staff caring 
200 In both In Re F, above n 87 , and In Re J, above n 69, it was possible to weigh the 
alternatives available and make a value judgment regarding the consequences to the 
sensate patient of withholding or administering medical treatment. 
201 Bland, above n 1, 361. See also B Jennett and C Dyer "Persistent Vegetative State and 
the Right to Die : The United States and Britain" (1991) 302 BMJ 1256, 1258. 
202 Shapiro, above n 33 , 44 7 . See also Gold, above n 35 , 1091. 
203 Bland, above n l, 372; 385. 
204 Bioethics Research Centre . above n 6, 25: Dresser. above n 63 , 383 . 
205 Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 25; Dresser. above n 63, 393. 
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for Anthony Bland and the huge expenditure of skill, labour and money which 
would be more fruitfully employed in treating other patients. 206 He considered 
Parliament alone to be responsible for a social cost-benefit analysis of that kind. 
In the end though, it was the futility of the medical treatment which justified its 
termination. 207 This prompted Lord Keith to hold, without reference to the 
patient's best interests, that: 208 
[A] medical practitioner is under no duty to continue to treat such a patient where a 
large body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the effect that no benefit at 
all would be conferred by continuance. 
Lord Keith' s decision recognises that a decision to withdraw artificial feeding 
cannot be guided by the patient's best interests. The patient's best interest 
approach is clearly inapplicable to PVS patients. Consequently, 'reasonable 
person' considerations surreptitiously enter the decision making process and, 
inevitably, form the basis of the decision. This approach is conceptually 
unsound and should not be adopted in New Zealand. 
Substituted Judgment 
A further approach to decision-making which has received considerable attention 
in the United States, is substituted judgment. Substituted judgment describes an 
approach in which "the objective intent of the formerly competent patient is 
allowed to govern" decision-making. 209 Under this approach, the surrogate 
makes a decision whether to refuse treatment on the patient's behalf. The 
decision is based on an assessment of what the patient would have chosen if he 
were competent and cognisant of the information relevant to his current 
treatment situation. 210 
Courts have adopted this standard in an effort to respect the individual's 
previously held values. It is considered that these values should not be negated 
by incompetence, but should be voiced by family or friends and given 
206 Bland, above n 1, 397; see also Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 382. 
207 Bland, above n l , 362, 372. 
208 Bland, above n I, 362 . See also Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Commiuee 
[1957] 2 ALL ER 118 . 
209 Cantor, above n 72, 63 . 
210 In Re Quinlan , above n 69, 664 ; In Re Conroy, above n 51, 1230-32; Cruzan, above n 
84; Superintendent of Belchertown State School , above n 62; Gaudin, above n 50; 
1328; James Bopp "Reconciling Autonomy and the Value of Life" (1990) 38 Journal of 
American Geriatrics Societv 600 . 601.Dresser. above n 63 , 376-377: President's 
Comm1ss1on . aoovc n Y4. 132-133. 
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appropriate recognition. 211 This is not, by definition, an exercise of the 
patient's self-determination or autonomous choice . 
Neither is substituted judgment a decision in the patient's best interests . The 
question is not whether the proposed conduct is more beneficial to the patient, 
but what would the particular patient have done if she had been able to choose. 
If the patient would have made a decision against her best interests, then the 
substituted decision must reflect this. 212 In most cases , patient's best interests 
and substituted judgment will overlap and result in the same decision, since 
people usually make decisions in their own interests. Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that a court would sanction a decision it considered adverse to the patient's best 
interests. 
Surrogates acquire considerable power because patients are unable to dispute the 
surrogate's assessment of their values and wishes. 213 To curb possible abuses 
of power, the strictest application of substituted judgment requires the decision 
to be made on clear and convincing evidence of the patient's expressed treatment 
preferences. 214 A heightened evidentiary standard has positive and negative 
aspects. 
Commentators have criticised the standard as insurmountable in cases where the 
court requires specific, express statements by the patient about the treatments or 
medical procedures they would wish to be withheld. 215 Clear and convincing 
evidentiary standards may thwart the substituted judgment approach because it 
requires patients to exercise a level of foresight they may not possess. 216 
Nevertheless, the clear and convincing standard itself is still appropriate , given 
the enormity of the decision being made . It ensures that the decision is made on 
evidence which accurately reflects the choices incompetent patients would have 
made if they were able . However. this evidentiary standard renders the 
substituted judgment approach inapplicable to the patients under consideration; 
those who have not provided reliable evidence of their treatment preferences. 
211 Bioethics Research Centre, above n 6, 25 . 
212 Bopp , above n 210, 601. 
213 Bopp , above n 210, 601. 
214 Cruzan , above n 84 ; 2852-54 . 
215 Gaudin , above n 50 . 1331 ; Shapiro , above n 33,444 . 
216 Shapiro, above n 33, 445. 
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A less stringent evidentiary standard does not require specific indications of the 
patient's wishes, but allows a variety of evidence to be considered, including the 
family's best judgment as to what decision the patient would have made. 217 
The family has been granted this discretion in some instances because it is 
assumed that family members will have the welfare of the patient at heart and 
they are considered best situated to know the wishes, tastes, and preferences of 
the patient. 218 
In most cases , the family will make a bona fide decision. However, the 
family's objectivity and neutrality may be strained by emotional (and possibly 
financial) pressure. 219 This standard is also open to abuse by family members 
who harbour ulterior motives for their relative' s death. The failure to delineate 
clear evidentiary requirements on which to exercise substituted judgment may 
well subordinate the patient 's previously held goals and values to third party 
interests . 220 Therefore, the lower evidentiary standard may also be 
unacceptable. 
The House of Lords in Bland simply rejected the substituted judgment approach. 
Lord Goff considered that it formed no part of the English law in relation to 
incompetent adults . Lord Mustill categorically rejected the operation of 
substituted judgment: 221 
To postulate a patient who is in such a condition that he cannot know that there is a 
choice to be made, or indeed know anything at all , and then ask whether he would have 
chosen to terminate his life because that condition made it no longer worth living is 
surely meaningless . . . The ideas is simply a fiction , which I would not be willing to 
adopt even if there were in the case of Anthony Bland any materials upon which a 
surrogate could act ... 
The writer agrees . A fundamental problem with any application of substituted 
judgment is that the surrogate's decision will in all probability be affected by his 
or her own views about continued treatment. The decisions are more likely to 
reflect the surrogate's own values than the patient's because the surrogate can 
never confidently state that the patient would have decided in a particular way , 
because the patient's position has changed dramatically since entering the PVS . 
Consequently, substituted judgment is abandoned in favour of quality of life 
217 In Re Quinlan , above n 69 , 664 ; In Re Jobes 529 A 2d 434,444-46 (1987) ; Gaudin, 
above n 50 , 1331 -34 . 
2 18 Cantor, above n 72 , 107. These factors explain familial involvement in decisions to 
withdraw treatment generally . 
2 19 Cantor, above n 72 , 108 . 
220 Dresser. above n 63. 379. 
22 l Bland. above n I. 396. 
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considerations. 222 For these reasons, substituted judgment should not be 
adopted as the decision-making standard. 
Good Medical Practice 
Good medical practice has already been examined in relation to liability under 
the Crimes Act 1961. It is the ideal and logical standard for decision making in 
New Zealand and should be incorporated into law. 223 Good medical practice 
reflects procedures and protocol currently adopted in hospitals, i.e . health 
professionals and family members conferring about treatment decisions. This 
approach is also sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes in medical 
practice and knowledge. 
The primary decision making responsibility is confined to the parties with 
medical or familial involvement with the patient. 224 Requiring familial consent 
to the decision recognises the family's fundamental involvement in the situation. 
It also introduces elements of substituted judgment as most families would be 
guided by their honest perception of their relative' s wishes. 225 Close family 
members would ordinarily make a compassionate decision and doctors would 
furnish a safeguard should families try to make arbitrary decisions. 226 
The patient's best interest cannot guide doctors' subjective decision, although 
other relevant factors may, including limited resources. 227 This is not a 
justification in itself for withholding treatment, but medical decisions are not 
made in an idyllic context; resources are scarce. Furthermore, the doctor 's 
decision must be bona fide and command general approval in the profession. 
Approval or review of the decision by an ethics committee provides an 
opportunity for societal perspectives to influence the delicate decision to 
222 Bopp, above n 210, 602. 
223 The Issues Committee of the New Zealand Law Society , above n 23 , 3, recommended 
that legislative changes should incorporate a similar standard where there is no evidence 
of the patient's wishes . Pending legislative change, the Committee recommended that 
the New Zealand Medical Council adopt this standard in guidelines for the profession. 
224 Mendelson, above n 95, 15; Cantor, above n 72 , 110. 
225 For example see Bland, above n 1, 324; 364. 
226 Cantor, above n 72, 110. 
227 See In Re J (A Minor) (Child In Care: Medical Treatment) [ 1992] 3 WLR 507 , 517. 
See also Bland, above n 1, 359 where Hoffmann L J pointed out that the costs of 
maintaining PVS patients are high. and the allocation of resources between patients is a 
matter fo r the health aurhonty. 
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withdraw life-sustaining nutrition and hydration. 228 Ethics committees could 
also provide useful guidance should they be approached by doctors or families. 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
To this point, discussion has focussed on decision-making standards for 
incompetent patients who have left no indication of their treatment preferences 
whilst they were competent. Yet many patients have the foresight to leave 
instructions regarding medical treatment and procedures they would considerable 
acceptable should they become incompetent. 
Lord Goff considered that the notion of self-determination extends to these 
situations, requiring the patient's earlier wishes to be respected in the event that 
they become incompetent. 229 Though, in these circumstances, especial care 
must be taken to ensure that the patient's prior indications regarding refusal of 
treatment are applicable in the circumstances that have subsequently 
occurred. 230 Despite the paramountcy of autonomy, if the patient's refusal is 
not clear and convincing it may be overridden. In this dictum the House of 
Lords supported the qualified recognition given by the Court Jn Re T231 to 
advance directives for medical care. 
This section will consider the validity of advance directives in New Zealand as a 
method of refusing maintenance-of-life regimes should the person fall into a 
permanent vegetative state. 
"Advance Directive" describes two forms of arrangement a person can make for 
her future health care should she become incompetent. 232 The first is a "living 
will" (probably better termed an advance directive) and the second type refers to 
228 The Biological and Medical Issues Committee of the ew Zealand Law Society 
envisaged a reduced role for the ethics committees . They were visualised as arbitrators 
in the event of disputes. Above n 23, 3. 
229 Bland, above n 1. 367 . 
230 Bland, above n l, 367 . 
231 In Re T (Adult : Refusal of Treatment) [199213 WLR 782. 
232 The living Will - Consent to Treatment At the End of Life A Working Party Report 
Under the Auspices of Age of Concern, Institute of Gerontology and Centre of Medical 
Law and Ethics, Kings College, London (Edward Arnold. London, 1988) 1. R 
Paterson "The Rieht of Patients to Refuse Medical Treatment" (1991) NZ Doctor 33 . 
L Brennan J"hc K,gnt l o Die 119931143 :S.. LJ 1041. 
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the appointment of a proxy decision-maker through an enduring power of 
attorney (EPA). Before turning to consider living wills, Value Statements will 
be outlined briefly. 
Value Statements 
The Institute of Public Law at the University of New Mexico recognised the 
potential role evidence of a person's values could have in guiding surrogate 
decisions, since people's wishes are often a reflection of their values .233 
Consequently, the Institute devised a Values History Form for people to 
complete, if they wish to maintain maximum control over their person. The 
values statement is not a substitute for an advance directive; it is supplementary 
to it, and should provide valuable guidance. 234 
Living Will 
A living will is a document in which a competent person directs what medical 
treatment or measures should be taken if he or she become, for example, 
permanently unconscious, and obviously unable to make medical care 
decisions. 235 In the United States, statutes regulate advance directives in 48 out 
of 50 states.236 Legislation shields doctors from liability, criminal or civil, and 
from discipline for unprofessional conduct, if the doctor acts in accordance with 
the patient's directions in a living will. 
Living wills provoke several legal problems . Some doctors feel that living wills 
give useful indications of patients' wishes, but unless they are current and clear, 
they do not provide absolute assurances and are not binding . 237 Hence, a 
decision not to follow an advance directive may be justified if the patient did not 
anticipate the particular situation she is in and within which the medical decision 
233 Lanham, above n 38 , 97 . 
234 Lanham, above n 38, 97 . Lanham reproduces a Values History Form in the appendix 
to his book. 
235 Age of Concern, above n 232; Paterson, above n 232 . 
236 Brennan indicates that the most recent development in the United States following the 
Cruzan case is the Patient 's Self-Determination Act 1990 which requires federally 
funded institut ions to inform patients about the possibility of making advance 
directives . Above n 232 . 
237 Cook , above n 52, 132. See also Bland, above n I , 367 . 
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must be made. 238 If the living will is not phrased with sufficient specificity to 
reflect the circumstances in which it is to guide treatment, then it may be 
overridden. 
The second problem with living wills concerns the "triggering event", 239 or the 
condition the person must be in to invoke the living will. Traditionally, 
terminal illness is required to trigger the living will. However, advance 
directives are relevant not only in cases of incompetence and terminal illness, 
where life-sustaining procedures merely prolong death, 240 and they should not 
be so limited. They are also relevant in cases of incompetence generally, 
where, for example, the patient is permanently unconscious. A Canadian case, 
Malette v Shulman , has confirmed the validity of a living will executed by a 
Jehovah' s Witness, refusing blood transfusions in all circumstances , even though 
the patient would have died if the treatment was not provided. 241 The Court 
held that the doctor was bound in law by the patient's choice and that the 
patient's right to self-determination was paramount. Therefore, incompetence 
alone could trigger the living will , through which the patient may refuse life 
sustaining medical care. 
Living wills in New Zealand 
There are several indications that living wills may be considered valid and 
binding in New Zealand. First, their judicial recognition in Malette and Bland 
provides persuasive authority for the suggestion that courts should uphold a 
patient's refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration through a clear and 
convincing living will as a legitimate exercise of personal autonomy. 242 In 
addition to overseas cases, the New Zealand common law has upheld the 
individual's right to self-determination and to decline medical treatment. 243 The 
refusal must be respected no matter how unreasonable it may appear. 
Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 also reinforces 
individual's right to self determination and to decline medical treatment. A 
distinction should not be drawn between a competent patient's refusal of 
238 President 's Commission, above n 94 , 137 . 
239 I Kennedy and A Grubb Medical Law Text and Materials (Butterworths, London , 1989) 
1118; Age of Concern, above n 232, 52 . 
240 Kennedy et al , above n 239 , 1118. 
241 Malette v Schulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 32 1. 
242 The Issues Committee made a similar recommendation, above n 23, 2 . 
243 Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [ 19651 ZLR 191. 
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treatment and a clear advance directive through which a patient refuses treatment 
should she become incompetent. 244 This section arguably provides broad 
legislative recognition of the validity of living wills. 
Therefore, although there is no definitive statutory indication of living wills' 
legal status it is submitted that, if they are clear and current, they should be 
legally binding. Living will legislation governing the form, scope and 
requirements for the validity of these advance directives may be more of a 
hindrance than a help. 245 If advance directives are to be given definitive 
validity through legislation, then the preferable approach would involve 
amending the enduring power of attorney provisions in the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR Act). 
Enduring Powers Of Attorney In New Zealand 
An enduring power of attorney (EPA) is an alternative form of advance directive 
by which a competent person ('donor') authorises another ('attorney') to act on 
her behalf in general or specific medical matters should she be rendered 
incompetent to refuse or consent to medical care. 246 EP As may operate more 
successfully than living wills because the attorney will be able to make a 
decision after considering all the circumstances, some of which may not have 
been foreseen earlier. 
Under common law, powers of attorney terminate on the incompetency of the 
donor. 24 7 However, Part IX of the PPPR Act provides for the appointment of a 
proxy under an EPA. 
244 Bioethics Research Centre above n 6, 24. 
245 Living wills legislation may restrict people's freedom of choice instead of reinforcing it. 
For example, the Australian Natural Death Acts limit the scope of living wills to the 
refusal of extra ordinary treatment where the patient is terminally ill. Lanham, above n 
38, 64-5. See also R Gillon "Living Wills, Powers of Attorney and Medical Practice" 
(1988) Journal of Medical Ethics 59. 
246 Paterson. above n 232. 
247 Paterson, above n 232; W R Atkin "Enduring Powers of Attorney in New Zealand" 
(1988) NZLR 368. 
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Section 98 of the PPPR Act permits a donor to authorise an attorney to make 
decisions in relation to the donor's personal care and welfare. However, the 
attorney does not have the power to refuse consent, on the patient's behalf, to 
any standard life-saving medical treatment or procedure. 248 Artificial feeding is 
a standard medical procedure. Therefore, the PPPR Act in its present form does 
not permit an attorney to refuse artificial feeding, and allow the PVS patient to 
die. Consequently, EPAs at present fail to uphold the patient's right to self-
determination at the critical moment. 
Ideally, this provision should be amended to allow attorneys to refuse standard 
medical procedures for permanently vegetative patients. 249 This would provide 
a clear means for those who wish to exercise their individual autonomy to its 
full extent, and maintain complete control over their body, to do so. 
248 Sections 98(4) and 18(l)(c) of the PPPR Act. For an analysis of Section 18(l)(c) see E 
Grant "Consent to Medical Procedures and the Protection of Personal and Property 
Rights Act 1988" ( 1989) 7 Otago Law Review 161 , 169-170 . 
249 Issues Committee. above n 23 , 4. 
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CONCLUSION 
Withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from PVS patients represents one 
of the least distasteful options of letting the patient die. Nevertheless, it is a 
very difficult and perplexing step, which many health professional may not be 
prepared to take just yet, irrespective of the conclusion on criminal 
responsibility. These health professionals need to be sure in themselves that 
withdrawal of a nasogastric tube is the morally correct step to take, which will 
not cause the relatives, or medical and nursing staff, any more pain. 250 
For those families and health professionals who are fearful only of criminal 
responsibility, judicial or legislative guidelines governing the legality of 
removing artificial feeding regimes are necessary . This should avoid regularised 
judicial involvement in these private decisions, which would become financially 
and emotionally expensive for all parties concerned. In the end, however, the 
only acceptable long-term solution to this problem requires legislative initiate. 
It is unlikely that reform could provide an exhaustive guide to terminal decision-
making on specifically defined objective criteria given the vast array of potential 
cases. It could, however, dissipate some of the uncertainties by outlining the 
bases on which the law feels terminal decisions should be made. To this end, it 
is suggested that Legislation could incorporate guidelines reflecting the good 
medical practice approach outlined earlier. It could also definitively recognise 
the validity of clear and convincing advance directives, and the PPPR Act could 
be appropriately amended. Decisions made on these criteria should be 
legislatively attributed death to natural causes. In this way legislation could 
shield doctors from any form of liability in the event that they removed artificial 
feeding from a PVS patient. 
In the absence of legislative initiative, hospital protocol already seems to follow 
the good medical practice standard outlined in AHB. If an application is made 
for a declaratory ruling as to the lawfulness of withdrawing life-sustaining 
nutrition and hydration, the court should adopt the ARB approach not the Bland 
approach. Reference may be made to the House of Lords ' decision to illustrate 
the propriety of withdrawing artificial feeding , or the operation of the doctrine 
of necessity to obviate criminal responsibility . Otherwise , the approach has 
serious weaknesses which must be avoided . 
250 Dr R Worth , above n 30. 
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The New Zealand court has already illustrated its willingness to issue guidelines 
in order to avoid judicial intervention into the medical domain and the private 
domain of the family making the traumatic decision with health professionals. 
This is how it should be . There is every reason why a similar approach should 
be , and will be followed in a case involving the withdrawal of artificial feeding 
from a patient in the persistent vegetative state. 
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~PPENDIX 
R Ornstein & R F 'lbanpson 
('lhe HcX3arth Press, I.Dndon, 1985) 
midbrain 
pons 
medulla 
The Brainstem 
The brainsten1 is the oldest part of the brain. It evolved more 
than five hundred 1nillion years ago. Because it resembles the 
entire brain of a reptile, it is often referred to as the reptilian 
brain. It determines the general level of alertness and warns the 
organism of important incoming information, as well as han-
dling basic bodily functions necessary for survival-breathing 
and heart rate . 
cerebellum 
The Cerebellunt 
The cerebellum, or "little brain," is attached to the rear of the 
brainstem. Among other functions, the cerebellum maintains 
and adjusts posture and coordinates muscular movement. The 
importance of these functions is evident when we realize that 
the cerebellum in the human brain has more than tripled in size 
in just the last million years. It now appears that memories for 
simple learned responses may be stored there. 
left hemisphere 
right hemisphere 
right hemisphere 
The Cerebrum 
left hemisphere 
The largest part of the human brain is the cerebrum. It is divided 
into two halves, or hemispheres, each of which controls its oppo-
site half of the body The hemispheres are connected by a band of 
some three hundred million nerve cell fibers called the corpus 
callosum. Covering each hemisphere is a one-eighth-inch-thick, 
intricately folded layer of nerve cells called the cortex. The cor-
tex first appeared in our ancestors about two hundred million 
years ago, and it is what makes us uniquely human. Because of 
it, we are able to organize, remember, communicate, under-
stand, appreciate, and create. 
parietal lobe-----
cerebellum----~-
frontal lobe 
~-temporal lobe 
-------brainstem 
The Lobes of the Cortex 
The cortex of each hemisphere is divided into four areas called 
lubes. The frontal lobe is primarily involved in planning, 
decision making, and purposeful hehavior. The parietal lobe 
represents the body in the brain. It receives sensory information 
from the bo<ly. Part of the occipital lobe is devoted to vision and 
is often called the visual cortex. The temporal lobe appears to 
have several important functions, including hearing, perception, 
and memory. 

